What Lenders Think Borrowers Think Of Lending And Lenders: A Psychographic Study Of Rural Credit Cooperatives In Shandong, China by Xu, Xiaolan
  
 
 
WHAT LENDERS THINK BORROWERS THINK OF LENDING AND LENDERS: 
A PSYCHOGRAPHIC STUDY OF RURAL CREDIT COOPERATIVES IN 
SHANDONG, CHINA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Science  
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Xiaolan Xu 
August 2012 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2012 Xiaolan Xu 
  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we conduct a field survey among 120 loan officers at Rural Credit 
Cooperatives (RCCs) in China’s coastal Shandong province, to pair with an existing 
survey on identical questions to 394 farm households in the same region.  Pairing 
lenders’ perceptions towards borrowers regarding RCC microcredit lending 
mechanisms, against borrowers’ perceptions towards lenders and how they themselves 
were perceived by lenders in the same regard, we observe a perceptual disconnect 
between them in the context of lenders’ “care” towards borrowers, loan rejection, 
memberships of RCC and group guarantee, lending concerns, cost of borrowing, 
reasons for default, credit rationing, and lending preferences.  With distinct cluster 
groupings based on their perceptions, we analyze the influence of demographics on the 
borrower and lender cluster memberships.  We draw conclusions that policy initiatives 
should be put in place at RCCs that close the gap between the two parties in their 
credit relationship, concentrating on advocating RCCs’ care and trust towards 
agriculture and farm households, while providing credit education to rural households; 
at the institutional level, effort should be extended to train a dedicated team of loan 
officers that specialize in servicing farm households with standardized lending 
practices.  This research provides financial institutions with outreach mechanisms to 
borrowers, while also training lenders to borrowers’ sensitivities. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs) serve as one of the major government regulated sources of 
agricultural credit dedicated to providing loans to farm households and small and medium size enterprises 
(SMEs) in rural China1.  As the largest microcredit practitioners in China in terms of formal financial 
institutions, RCCs play a significant role in supplying financial resources to rural economic development 
in China. 
Rural China is traditionally an underserved market for credit resources.  As of February 2012, the 
loan-to-GDP ratio was 49% in rural areas versus 224% in urban areas. 2   By the end of 2010, the 
outstanding balance of agriculture-related loans3 reached RMB11.8 trillion, up RMB2.63 trillion or 28.8 
percent from the beginning of the year.  Such growth was 5.7 percentage points higher than the average 
growth among all types of loans.  The proportion of agriculture-related loans to total loans witnessed a 1.6 
percent year-on-year growth rate, which signified a powerful financial support to agricultural and rural 
development.  As of 2010, China had 2,646 RCCs with 550,859 staff in total4, while total assets of RCCs 
reached RMB6.4 trillion, representing a 13.4 percent compound annual growth rate (CAGR) 5 from 
RMB2.7 trillion in 2003; total liabilities reached RMB6.1 trillion, representing a 12.6 percent CAGR 
from RMB2.7 trillion in 2003; and total owner’s equity reached RMB 279.3 billion, representing a 212.8 
                                                          
1 The other two major sources are Postal Savings Banks and Agricultural Banks. 
2  According to an equity research report issued by Credit Suisse on Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank, 15 
February 2012. 
3 Categorized as on the RCC book. 
4 Overall, Chinese banking institutions numbered 3,769, possessing 196,000 business outlets and 2.991 million 
employees as of 2010. (CBRC 2010 AR) 
5 Compound annual growth rate, calculated based on statistics from CBRC 2010 annual report. 
2 
 
percent CAGR from the negative RMB 13.7 billion in 20036 (See Figure 1.1 for breakdown, data from 
CBRC Annual Report 2010). 
 
Figure 1.1: Change of RCC Balance Sheet Composition 
 
 
1.1.1. Evolution of RCCs 
RCCs have a long history and play a prominent role in China’s rural financial system.  The first 
RCC was founded in northern China in 1923 (Myers, 1970) and the idea and implementation spread to 
such an extent that by 1939 RCCs were being established by the government all over China (Fei & Chang, 
1945).7  Rural credit cooperatives underwent four main transitions, along with the decollectivization and 
market reforms in rural China.  The first can be backdated to the collectivization in 1958 when the RCCs 
were incorporated into the People’s Commune to mobilize capital for large-scale projects.  From then on, 
“cooperative” has been standing for merely a literal meaning.  Though the People’s Commune collapsed 
after the three-year famine and was substituted by the “Production Team”, a smaller unit, the cooperatives 
were still one of the components in the collectivized establishment.  The second transition took place after 
                                                          
6 The State Council enacted the “Pilot Plan to Deepen the Reform of Rural Credit Cooperatives” in 2003 in order to 
clarify the ownership of RCCs and to re-place them under the direct supervision of provincial governments instead 
of the hitherto existing joint involvement of the PBOC and the RCC County Union (Guo & Jia, 2009).  One of the 
possible explanations for the negative equity in 2003 might be the policy environment that in the same year the State 
subsidized the recorded non-performing loans on RCCs’ books. 
7 Guo and Jia (2009) provide an excellent review of the evolution and reforms of RCCs 
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the introduction of the Household Responsibility System (HRS) 8  in 1978.  Agricultural production 
increased remarkably at that time.  Degraded as one part of the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the 
RCCs were in fact under the control of provincial governments and played a critical role in developing 
the township and village enterprises (TVEs).  In 1997, the central government decided to place RCCs 
back under the direct supervision of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the central bank, because of the 
mounting non-performing loans on the RCC book.  At the third stage, RCCs became independent from 
the ABC in 1997 and were placed under the supervision of the PBOC, which exerted rigorous influence 
on RCCs’ operation, especially the loan business.  Besides financial depression, the PBOC introduced the 
agriculture-embarked-on lending programs by providing cheap loans to RCCs in 1998, with a growth rate 
of 20 percent for agricultural loan portfolios (Cheng and Xu, 2004).  Though RCCs were afraid to 
infringe on the regulations or directives from the central bank, they were more inclined to fund projects 
that had lower risks and higher capital return.  During that period, the shortage of institutional lending in 
rural China was exacerbated.  Meanwhile, a variety of informal financial institutions sprang up.  However, 
informal finance was banned by the central government because of its illegal operations and accompanied 
financial unrest.   
At the fourth stage, the poor services of RCCs, together with the depressed prices of agricultural 
products and the long-lasting downturn of rural households’ income, forced the central government to 
deepen its RCC reforms.  It is for these reasons that the State Council enacted the “Pilot Plan to Deepen 
the Reform of Rural Credit Cooperatives” in 2003 to clarify the ownership of RCCs and to re-place them 
under the direct supervision of provincial governments instead of the hitherto existing joint involvement 
of the PBOC and the RCCU (RCC County Union).  A variety of ownership arrangements are 
recommended to allow regional difference in terms of local economic and social environment.  The time-
period of 1999-2004 earmarked the participation of formal financial institutions and the 
institutionalization of various projects.  RCCs started to introduce microcredit loan and group loan 
businesses to rural households in 1999.  The experimentation made by the various RCCs have seen much 
                                                          
8 Under which individual farm households became the basic producing units. 
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success in provinces like Shaanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Hebei, Guangxi, and Guizhou which experienced 
faster microcredit growth. 
In recent years, the policy has centered on restructuring of the highly fragmented rural banking 
sector.  The number of RCCs dropped precipitously from 19,348 in 2006 to 2,646 in 2010, although their 
total assets increased steadily indicating that many of them have undergone consolidation. (See Figure 1.2, 
data from CBRC annual reports). This period was characterized by an RCC mergers and acquisitions 
spree encouraged, and in some cases financially sponsored, by the State, with the aim of restructuring 
high risk RCCs. 
 
Figure 1.2: Consolidation of RCCs 2006 - 2010 
 
 
The most recent RCC reform is geared towards transforming credit cooperatives into commercial 
banks 9 , while optimizing RCC institutional operational procedures and risk management towards a 
commercial banking standard, with most notably the December 2010 IPO of Chongqing Rural 
Commercial Bank, the third-largest rural commercial bank in China, which was established through many 
amalgamations of rural credit cooperatives and unions at the village, township, county and municipal 
levels10, becoming the first small- and medium-sized rural financial institution embarking on stock listing.  
                                                          
9 CBRC 2010 Annual Report, p.36 
10 CRCB is the third largest rural commercial bank in China, following BRCB (Beijing Rural Commercial Bank) 
and SRCB (Shanghai Rural Commercial Bank), and the largest commercial bank in Chongqing.  It was established 
through 39 rural credit unions and managed by the Chongqing Rural Credit Cooperative Union at the municipal 
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With Beijing Rural Commercial Bank, and Shanghai Rural Commercial Bank, its two strong competitors 
with identical background converting from RCCs and RCCUs in the Beijing and Shanghai areas 
respectively, actively preparing for IPOs at the moment11, we conclude that the current RCC institutional 
effort as being pushed towards commercialization. 
However, are these policies and reforms effective?  Turvey and Kong (2010) argue that China 
needs a dedicated source of credit for farm households, and in a broader sense for agricultural economic 
activities.  While the recent policy initiative, which pushes RCCs towards commercialization has 
improved the RCC governance and diversified their sources of funding, it does not address the needs of 
farm households per se.  In an effort to develop rural areas, the central government has launched a number 
of initiatives to promote Sannong (agricultural, rural and farmer-related) business.  For instance, financial 
institutions are exempt from paying business tax for interest income on small loans to agricultural 
households.12  Banks are encouraged to expand their Sannong loans at a faster pace than overall loan 
growth and to maintain the percentage of their Sannong loans at higher levels than in the previous year.  
Besides this macroeconomic intermediation, RCCs seem to lag behind on their operational effort in 
lending to farm households.13  Improvement in RCCs’ institutional efficiency would lead to increased 
access to credit in this underserved market. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
level.  In June 2008, CRCB was incorporated as a provincial-level rural commercial bank, the first one in Western 
China. With its legacy as a rural credit cooperative, the bank is primarily focused on the provision of financial 
services to SMEs and county-area corporates/households.  CRCB is a market leader in SME lending in Chongqing, 
with 52% of its loan book dedicated to the SME sector in 2010.  Similarly, it has a dominant position in county-area 
business and ranks #1 in county-area lending, with 26% loan market share as of June 2010. (CRCB 2010 Interim 
Report) 
11 Interviews with Yiting Liu and Bill Stacey, China bank analysts at Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, a financial 
institutions specialized research institution. And “Continuous development of new-type rural financial institutions” 
(CBRC 2010AR. p36, p48); “Improvement of rural finance” (CBRC 2010AR. p.49) 
12 CBRC No.209, 2010 http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/govView_01935BE69968470C8989847E5A9BF2FD.html   
13 Managers and loan officers at Shandong RCCs that we surveyed in September 2011 mentioned in interviews that, 
the current RCC lending environment is a “lenders’ market”.  They also indicated that their RCCs have preference 
of lending to SMEs over farm households. 
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1.2 Diagonal relationship among financial institutions, their employees, and customers 
One aspect of institutional efficiency that may well be overlooked is the relationship between 
lenders and borrowers. 
To place this problem in context, we refer to Figure 1.3, in which the bank marketing effort is 
summarized in a triangle form, with the two diagonal lines representing the relationships the bank 
possesses with its customer, and with its employee, respectively, and the lower line representing the 
relationship between the customer and the bank employee.  We find existing bank marketing literature 
focuses almost entirely on the two diagonal lines and illustrates how the bank interacts with the customer, 
and from the HR perspective how the bank interacts with the employees. This paradigm assumes that if 
both diagonals are known, then automatically the lower relationship between bank employees and 
borrowers is known by default; i.e. two equations and one unknown would allow the third to be identified.  
But is this true? 
 
Figure 1.3: Triangle Relationship among Bank, Employee, and Customer 
 
From the financial institutional perspective, previous literature focuses on the relationships 
between the customer and the bank (traditional product marketing), and between the employee and the 
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bank (human resource). On the bank-customer side, Harrison (1994) conducted a qualitative study on 
psychographic segmentation that uses variables such as the individuals' own perceived knowledge and 
understanding of financial services, the perceived confidence and ability in dealing with financial matters 
and the expressed level of interest (involvement) in financial services.  With this study four distinct 
customer segments based on the level of knowledge and on the degree of the customers' financial 
maturity could be identified.  The segments are labeled “financially confused”, “apathetic minimalists”, 
“cautious investors” and “capital accumulators” and are hence characterized by particular attitudes 
towards financial services provided by the bank.  On the bank-employee side, Bennett and Durkin (2002) 
introduced the notion of relationship marketing and examined the optimal bank organizational culture 
within the bank-customer-employee triangle framework in Figure 1.3, and concluded that the outcome of 
a successful implementation of an organizational development program should be the re-establishment of 
high levels of internalized employee commitment (diagonal line on the right side) coupled with the 
development of an integrated and focused strategy for customer relationship management (diagonal line 
on the left side). 
However, little research has covered the relationship between the customer and the employee of 
the bank.  These inter-relationships between bank and customer, bank and employee, customer and 
employee are illustrated in Figure 1.3.  In essence, to guarantee sufficient supply in the microcredit 
market, clear, harmonious, and two way relationships must exist between the three points of the triangle – 
the bank, the employee, and the customer, as shown in the figure by the direct connections between the 
three points (Bennett and Durkin, 2002). 
We find little literature dealing with identical psychographic questions in general in China or 
elsewhere, and virtually none on rural microcredit market segmentation.  We hence do not have a 
hypothesis except for the null, i.e., we assume there is no difference between lenders’ and borrowers’ 
perceptions towards microcredit lending. 
This paper focuses on the psychographic side and examines lenders’ beliefs and biases towards 
borrowers and also borrowers’ beliefs, attitudes and biases towards lenders and lending activites.  This 
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study combines two matched data sets.  The first, collected by Dr. Rong Kong and her students in 
Shandong in 2009 queries farm households about their attitudes and belief’s regarding RCC lenders and 
lending activities.  In 2010 we took the opportunity to survey 120 front-line lenders in Shandong to query 
them on their attitudes regarding lending to farmers and agriculture.  In this survey we reversed questions 
asked of the farm households in Dr. Kong’s survey.  By matching questions in both surveys we can 
investigate what lenders think borrowers think of lending and lenders, and vice versa.  The overriding 
problem investigated in this paper is the disconnect between perceptions of front-line lenders and farm 
household borrowers with respect to RCC lending practices. Consequently the purpose of this paper is to 
provide recommendations to the financial institutions in those regards so as to inform corresponding 
policy initiatives in order to close the gap between the RCC employees and customers.  This practice adds 
value as it optimizes credit allocation of formal microcredit in rural China, and minimizes the search cost 
for credit between formal institutions and farm households, hence benefiting agricultural economic 
development. 
This study contributes to the literature by examining the direct relationship between lenders and 
borrowers on rural credit.  Without a comprehensive understanding of the disconnection on the bottom of 
the triangle in Figure 1.3, implications on disconnections on the other two diagonal lines of the triangle 
drawn from previous literature cannot be fully justified. 
 
1.3 Objectives 
The main objective of this paper is to assess different degrees of attitudes of lenders and 
borrowers on various sets of identical questions regarding many aspects of RCC microcredit supply and 
farm household credit demand.  The specific objectives are to discover and identify mismatches between 
the two parties, and to investigate both the objective side of their relationship, i.e., RCC lending 
mechanisms such as group guarantee, procedure of loan application, interest rates, collateral, etc., as well 
as the subjective side, such as the degree of satisfaction towards one another, belief of lenders’ “care” and 
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“trust” towards borrowers, etc..  By comparing a lab survey among 120 RCC front-line lenders in three 
counties in China’s Shandong province, with a field survey among 394 farm households in the same 
region, we examine the disconnect between lenders’ and borrowers’ perceptions on identical credit issues.  
These comparisons could lead to important outreach mechanisms to rural household borrowers while also 
training RCC lenders to borrowers’ sensitivities. 
 
1.4 Procedure  
To achieve these objectives I use a variety of techniques. First, I pair frequencies of each of the 
five attitudinal responses from lenders and borrowers and test the statistical significance in their 
differences; the interpretation on these differences is then supplemented by comparison of mean scoring 
of each question from both perspectives.  On a set of selected questions centering on perceptions, I 
conduct cluster analyses using the two-step method and identify two natural clusters of lenders with 
distinct attitudes and beliefs in the services that their RCCs and themselves provide to borrowers, as well 
as four natural clusters of borrowers with progressive attitudes regarding their favor towards RCC and the 
loan officers in the same regards.  Based on these cluster memberships, I run regression analyses to 
investigate the influence of specific demographics on the borrower and lender group memberships.  The 
uniqueness of this study is that we compare two sets of identical surveys from the opposite perspectives in 
the credit relationship, and particularly perception oriented questions, through which interesting results 
and meaningful inference can be drawn. 
 
1.5 Organization of the thesis 
In this chapter the importance of RCCs and rural credit to farm households have been discussed 
and the objectives of the study listed and justified.  The background literature is reviewed, and the 
theoretical framework and concepts of psychographic segmentation are discussed, in the second chapter.  
The design and layout of the field survey, and the methods used to assess the disconnect between lenders 
10 
 
and borrowers, is specified in the third chapter.  The results of comparing mean scores of borrower and 
lender attitudes are evaluated, and the cluster membership distinctions are assessed through discriminant 
analysis together with linear and Logit regressions in the fourth chapter.  A summary and conclusion of 
this study is outlined in the fifth chapter. 
 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Microcredit development in China 
China has the second largest number (200 million) of poor people in the world.  0.9 Billion out of 
the 1.4 Billion Chinese population is rural, most of whom earn less than US$3 per day14.  Introduced in 
1993, microfinance is a relatively young industry in China.  Since then the Chinese government has been 
providing loans for rural development through the three leading financial institutions – the Agricultural 
Bank of China (ABC), for larger farming units such as seed companies and marketing co-operatives, the 
Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC), for storing crops, distributing, marketing, or 
processing agricultural products, or for large-scale agricultural development projects, and lastly the Rural 
Credit Cooperatives (RCCs) for the township/village enterprises (TVEs), and middle-income farmers. 
The time-period of 1999-2004 embarked the participation of formal financial institutions and the 
institutionalization of various projects.  RCCs started to introduce microcredit loan and group loan 
businesses for rural households in 1999.  The experimentation made by the various RCCs has seen much 
success in provinces like Shaanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Hebei, Guangxi, and Guizhou which experienced 
faster microfinance growth.  At present, RCCs are the largest microfinance practitioners in China in terms 
of formal financial institutions.  
                                                          
14 The exchange rate between US dollar and Chinese yuan as of 6 May 2012 is 1.00USD = 6.29300CNY. 
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In 2006, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) permitted postal saving banks to gradually 
develop their collateral-based microloan services.  Since 2007, the CBRC encouraged microloan 
institutions and all financial institutions to offer microcredit to traditional farming households, households 
in a variety of business, sole proprietors and rural micro and small enterprises. Additionally, CBRC 
permitted individual, corporate legal entities and other social organizations investment towards 
establishment of microloan companies in 2008.  At present microloan companies are allowed to raise their 
funds from shareholders’ capital, donated funds, and borrow from (not more than two) banking financial 
institutions.  Since 2006 China’s central government has also opened up its financial markets to foreign 
MFIs. 
 
2.2 Economics study on microcredit demand and supply in China 
The importance of microfinance in facilitating rural lending and credit supply to the poor has long 
been articulated by scholars.  Karlan and Zinman (2001) examined credit elasticity in less-developed 
economies, and rejected hypotheses of price inelastic demand using randomized trials in South Africa.  
On Chinese microcredit demand specifically, Turvey et al. (2010) conducted surveys among 897 farm 
households in China’s Shannxi and Gansu provinces to estimate individual household credit demand 
elasticity, and provided empirical evidence that credit policy may best be established as a marketing effort, 
through which RCCs may encourage greater farm household borrowing by simply marketing existing 
services and refining services to better meet farmer needs. 
On rural credit in China, previous work has also examined a series of RCC institutional issues.  
Turvey and Kong (2010) looked at the competition in microcredit lending facing RCCs from informal 
sources such as friends and relatives.  Tsai (2004) provided a political science perspective and argued that 
the microcredit market in rural China is run by informal sector money lenders and that money lending or 
political opportunism are adverse artifacts of rural lending.  Cao and Turvey (2011) examined the 
incentive mechanisms and how the Personal Responsibility System (PRS) affects RCC front-line lenders’ 
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loan decision behaviors.  Vararuth and Turvey (2011) found the incidence of risk rationing in rural credit 
markets in China using data collected through a survey of 730 farm households in Shaanxi province in 
November 2010. 
 
2.3 Psychographic segmentation in bank marketing and in agricultural markets 
In the bank marketing literature, previous studies focus on the financial services customer and the 
perceptions, attitudes and motivations the customer has towards financial services.  The concept of 
psychographic segmentation was described in Christopher et al. (1993) as the following: “Psychographic 
segmentation involves an analysis of lifestyle characteristics, attitudes and personality.  Recent research 
in several countries suggests that the population can be divided into between ten and fifteen groups, each 
having an identifiable set of lifestyle, attitude and personality characteristics”. 
Psychographic segmentation addresses these issues since it purely assesses the way the customer 
thinks (Wills, 1985).  Psychographics look at “the inner person rather than the outward expression of the 
person” (Beane and Ennis, 1987).  However, the definition of psychographics remains controversial.  To 
some researchers psychographics refer to basic personality characteristics, whereas other definitions 
include attitudes, values and beliefs (Ziff, 1971). 
Ziff (1971) also stated that individuals have certain attitudes that are basic and influence their 
behavior in many different types of situations.  Such attitudes can, therefore, provide useful information 
of a general nature, and a core of attitudes, needs, and values can be used to provide the basis for a 
meaningful segmentation (Ziff, 1971).  
On customer segmentation specifically, Smith (1956) explained that companies try to segment 
their customers by identifying groups of persons with need structures that are as homogeneous as possible 
within each group and significantly heterogeneous between groups. 
Existing marketing research also shows that successful, continuing relationships are characterized 
by trust and commitment (Shemwell et al., 1994; Strandvik and Liljander, 1994; Morgan and Hunt, 1994).  
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Commitment is promoted by satisfaction, lower quality alternatives and greater investment and can be 
developed by the provision of benefits superior to the alternatives, communication, shared values and 
goodwill (Bennett and Durkin, 2002). 
When we examine the direct relationship between the bank lender and borrower, Levitt (1986) 
provided reference by pointing out that not all relationships can or need to be at the same level of 
intimacy or of the same duration, but rather that these characteristics depend on the extent of the actual or 
felt dependencies between the buyers and the sellers. 
We also find literature that use psychographic assessment in agricultural markets.  Funk and 
Hudon (1988) used psychographic clustering techniques in a survey study to segment the market for farm 
supplies in Ontario, Canada.  Irish (2012) provides a framework for understanding the characteristics that 
influence the degree of indebtedness on farm businesses, based on a factor analysis of respondents mean 
ratings of 13 attitudinal statements.  Both papers pioneered assessment of psychographic segmentation in 
agricultural markets. 
 
CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Data collection 
3.1.1 Survey design 
To measure this disconnect between lenders and borrowers, we design the lender survey to mimic 
an existing borrower survey, by reverse writing the exact same questions but from the lenders’ 
perspective, assessing loan officers’ attitudes towards farm household borrowers, as well as their views 
towards borrowers viewing them in the same regards. 
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3.1.2 Scaling 
The measurement of individual questions is based on the Likert scale (Likert, 1932).  With such a 
scale the respondents are allowed to give ordinal values as an expression of their attitudinal evaluation of 
items; the scale included a neutral value which allows individuals to articulate their indifference towards a 
certain statement.  Five answer categories (Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Moderately Agree, and 
Strongly Agree) were used for the survey questions. 
3.1.3 Layout 
The field survey was conducted through 5 September 2011 to 10 September 2011 in Cheng Wu, 
Cao Xian, and Shan Xian, subsequently, with two days assigned to each and two sessions for each day, in 
the morning and afternoon at regular RCC work time.  Participating loan officers were selected by RCC 
management from branches across the county, one or two days prior to the assessment date, based on staff 
availability.  The participant sample is comprised of loan officers with diverse experiences and 
qualifications, ranging from fresh college graduates, staff internally transferred from other departments 
who had been practicing loan servicing for short periods, as well as widely respected and experienced 
loan officers with ten to twenty years loan servicing experience while receiving education at levels below 
college or associate degrees.  Loan officers were compensated for their participation with cash equivalent 
of salary for one workday by local RCC standards.  The survey was designed and conducted on computer, 
which allowed respondents to submit the survey only upon completing every question.  Four agricultural 
economics professors and six graduate students were present to answer participants’ questions regarding 
the survey.  Before and at the end of each session, I conducted interviews to randomly selected loan 
officers to obtain qualitative understanding on lending practices, which proved to be helpful for data 
cleaning.  The project schedule is listed in Table 3.1. 
 
 
 
15 
 
Table 3.1: Schedule of Field Survey in Shandong, China, September 2011 
 
 
3.1.4 Sample 
Both borrower and lender surveys were collected in Shandong province. We also compare the 
borrower survey with an existing data set from the same survey conducted in 2009 in Shannxi province, 
to ensure representativeness of the borrower results, given we have limited valid data points for certain 
sets of questions. 
 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Comparing frequencies and tests of statistical significance 
a. Independent samples t-test 
To ensure that the differences we observe on the graphs are statistically significant, and that the 
disconnect between lenders and borrowers is “real”, we conduct the independent samples t-test for all 
question pairs.  The independent samples t-test compares the mean scores of two groups on a given 
variable, with the underlying assumption that each of the two populations being compared should follow 
County Date Session No. of Participants Interview
Cheng Wu 5-Sep S1 10 1 client manager, 1 director, 4 loan officers
S2 10
6-Sep S3 10 2 loan officers
S4 10
Cao Xian1 7-Sep S5 10 3 loan officers
S6 10
8-Sep S7 10
S8 10
Shan Xian 9-Sep S11 10 1 loan officer
S12 10
10-Sep S9 10 1 loan officer
S10 10
Note: 1. Two of the RCC branches that we surveyed in Cao Xian were its two "boutique 
branches", a pilot program initiated by the Shandong RCCU, that staff these branches with 
the most educated loan officers who were all college graduates.
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a normal distribution.  The null hypothesis is that the means of the two groups are not significantly 
different.  We use the independent two-sample t-test with unequal sample sizes and unequal variances of 
the two populations, which is suitable for our data.  The t statistic to test whether the population means 
are different can be calculated as follows, as adapted from Gujarati (1978): 
𝑡 = 𝑋�1− 𝑋�2
𝑠?̅?1−?̅?2
 
where  
𝑠?̅?1−?̅?2 =  �𝑠12𝑛1 +  𝑠22𝑛2  
and where 𝑠12 and  𝑠22  are the unbiased estimators of the variances of the two samples, 𝑛1 and 
𝑛2 are the numbers of observations in group one and group two.  In the significance test, the distribution 
of the test statistic is approximated as being an ordinary Student’s t-distribution with the degrees of 
freedom calculated as follows: 
𝑑.𝑓. = (𝑠12 𝑛1⁄ +  𝑠22 𝑛2⁄ )2(𝑠12 𝑛1⁄ )2 (𝑛1 − 1)⁄ +  (𝑠22 𝑛2⁄ )2 (𝑛2 − 1)⁄  
 
b. Mann-Whitney U test 
For certain questions, most typically the set of questions on reasons that lenders reject a loan, the 
valid data points are very limited (for this set of questions we only have valid survey results from 14 farm 
household borrowers), in which case the T test alone may not be sufficient to serve our purpose of 
validating the mismatches.  We therefore also take the non-parametric approach and back up the T-tests 
with the Mann-Whitney U test (also referred to as the Wilcoxon rank sum test)15.  Similar results were 
observed from both tests, with only 17 pairs out of a total of 83 pairs not being significantly different at 
the 0.05 level, except that the U tests were “unable to compute” in 4 pairs.   
                                                          
15 See brief discussion in Appendix on the comparison of the t test and Mann-Whitney U test.  
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As adapted from Wilcoxon (1945), the Mann-Whitney U test assumes that all the observations 
from both groups are independent, and that the responses are ordinal, i.e., it is observable which of the 
any given two observations is greater.  The null hypothesis is that the distribution of both groups are equal, 
under which the probability of an observation from one population (𝑋1) exceeding an observation from 
the second population (𝑋2) equals the probability of an observation from 𝑋2 exceeding an observation 
from 𝑋1 .  The null hypothesis proposes a symmetry between populations with respect to probability of 
randomly drawing a larger observation, whereas under the alternative hypothesis, the probability of an 
observation from one population (𝑋1) exceeding an observation from the second population (𝑋2) (after 
exclusion of ties) is not equal to 0.5.  The alternative may also be stated in terms of a one-sided test in 
which:  P (𝑋1 > 𝑋2) + 0.5 P (𝑋1 = 𝑋2) > 0.5. 
The test involves the calculation of the U statistic, which I describe as follows, as adapted from 
Sheskin (2003): 1) the first step in calculating the U is to arrange all the observations into a single ranked 
series, i.e., rank all the observations without regard to which sample they are in.  2) Add up the ranks for 
the observations which came from sample 1, and the sum of ranks in sample 2 follows by calculation.  
The sum of all the ranks therefore equals n (n+1)/2, where n is the total number of observations in both 
samples.  U is then calculated as: 
𝑈1 =  𝑅1 −  𝑛1(𝑛1 + 1)2  
where 𝑛1 is the sample size for sample 1, and 𝑅1 is the sum of the ranks in sample 1. 
Since there is no specification as to which sample is considered sample 1, an equally valid  
formula for U is: 
𝑈2 =  𝑅2 −  𝑛2(𝑛2 + 1)2  
When computing significances, the smaller value of 𝑈1and 𝑈2 is the one used.  The sum of the 
two values is calculated as: 
𝑈1 + 𝑈2 =  𝑅1 −  𝑛1(𝑛1 + 1)2 + 𝑅2 −  𝑛2(𝑛2 + 1)2  
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Plugging  𝑅1 + 𝑅2 = 𝑛 𝑛+12 ,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛 = 𝑛1 +  𝑛2, into the above formula, we find that the sum is 
𝑈1 + 𝑈2 =  𝑛1𝑛2. 
 
3.2.2 Cluster analysis 
The aim of a cluster analysis is to identify possible homogeneous subsets from a heterogeneous 
sample of objects (in our case, lenders and borrowers).  Thus it is an appropriate instrument for group 
segmentation.   
SPSS offers three separate approaches to cluster analysis, namely, Hierarchical, K-Means, and 
Two-Step.  The Hierarchical approach is chosen when little information is known on the data structure; 
the K-Means approach could be used if the number of clusters to be obtained is known; the Two-Step 
approach allows a combination of continuous and categorical variables which both hierarchical and K-
means procedures do not cater for.  Our survey data fits the third approach.  
The two-step procedure can detect the number of clusters without pre-specification. In principle 
each cluster is distinguished from another by a maximum distance measure in such a way that each cluster 
is distinct and heterogeneous from another, while certain attributes are common to all members within a 
cluster.  The clusters are defined and distinguished by the Mahalanobis distance, a statistical measure 
based on correlations between variables by which different patterns can be identified. It gauges similarity 
of an unknown sample set to a known one. The Mahalanobis distance is a multivariate effect size, given 
that it takes into account the correlations of the data set and is scale-invariant. As adapted from De 
Maesschalck et al. (2000), the Mahalanobis distance of a multivariate vector X from a group of values 
with mean µ and covariance matrix S is defined as: 
𝑑𝑠(𝑥) =  �(𝑥 −  𝜇)𝑇𝑆−1(𝑥 −  𝜇) 
where 𝑥 = (𝑥1,  𝑥2, 𝑥3, … , 𝑥𝑛)𝑇, and  𝜇 = (𝜇1,  𝜇2, 𝜇3, … , 𝜇𝑛)𝑇 
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In our analysis, the clustering process is divided into two steps.  One step is to compare the 
objects according to certain attributes (here, attitudinal dimensions) and the following step is to group 
them according to these attitudinal dimensions. 
It also allows us to specify the number of clusters required or to let the program estimate the 
optimal number of clusters.  The size of each cluster is an indication of its relative importance in 
determining the cluster group memberships. 
In this thesis I use the 4 borrower clusters naturally defined by SPSS, and 2 lender clusters 
obtained through the same method.  Considering the statistical inefficiency, i.e., loss in degree of freedom, 
resulting from forcing the number of clusters, I conduct the analyses based on the natural cluster numbers 
despite the disparity between lenders and borrowers. 
 
3.2.3 Clusters included in regressions 
The borrower and lender cluster membership variables were both incorporated in our regression 
analyses hereinafter, as the dependent variable in each to assess how a set of demographic predictors 
influence the cluster memberships of farm household borrowers and of front-line loan officers. 
The Mahalanobis distance measure, which defines the cluster membership, allows us, in principle, 
to minimize the cross-covariances occurring in the four linear regression equations, and the binary logistic 
regressions that we run in order to back up the linear regressions with matched statistical significance for 
each coefficient. 
 
3.2.4 Discriminant analysis 
Given a set of independent variables, discriminant analysis attempts to find linear combinations 
of those variables that best separate the groups of cases. These combinations are called discriminant 
functions and have the form displayed in the equation below: 
𝐷 = 𝑣1𝑋1 +  𝑣2𝑋2  + 𝑣3𝑋3 + ⋯+ 𝑣𝑖𝑋𝑖 + 𝑎 
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Where D = discriminate function, 
            v = the discriminant coefficient or weight for that variable 
            X = respondent’s score for that variable 
            a = a constant 
            i = the number of predictor variables 
This function is similar to a regression equation or function. The v’s are unstandardized 
discriminant coefficients analogous to the beta’s in the regression equation. These v’s maximize the 
distance between the means of the dependent variable. Good predictors tend to have large weights. This 
function maximizes the distance between the categories, i.e. results in an equation that has strong 
discriminatory power between groups. After using an existing set of data to calculate the discriminant 
function and classify cases, any new cases can then be classified. The number of discriminant functions is 
one less the number of groups. 
The procedure automatically chooses a first function that will separate the groups as much as 
possible. It then chooses a second function that is both uncorrelated with the first function and provides as 
much further separation as possible. The procedure continues adding functions in this way until reaching 
the maximum number of functions as determined by the number of predictors and categories in the 
dependent variable. 
 
3.2.5 Regression analyses 
To analyze the borrower and lender clusters and the determinants of membership groupings, I 
conduct Generalized Linearized Model (GLM) regressions with a set of predictor variables representing 
demographic information collected in the survey, and also conducted discriminant analyses to examine 
the specific contribution of each predictor in the total variances within the dependent group variable.  The 
GLM is a flexible generalization of ordinary linear regression that allows for response variables that have 
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other than a normal distribution. Under GLM we report results from both the linear regression and the 
multinomial logistic regression. We consider the following GLM regression specification: 
𝑌 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖 +  𝜇 
where 𝑋𝑖  (i = 1, 2, …, 23) are the 23 independent variables we have specified in the GLM 
regression. 
For the multinomial logistic regression, the logistic function is as follows: 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝑋𝑖) = 11 + 𝑒−(𝛽0+𝛽1 𝑋1+ 𝛽2 𝑋2+⋯+𝛽𝑖 𝑋𝑖) 
where 𝑋𝑖  (i = 1, 2, …, n) are the independent variables we have specified in the logistic 
regression. We include n = 23 for the borrower regressions and n = 17 for the lender regressions. 
 
3.3 Background on agriculture in Shandong 
Located on the east coast of China, Shandong is an agriculture oriented province which is more 
affluent compared with inner China.  Nationwide, Shandong RCCs have a high reputation in terms of 
lending practices, and hence are representative for our research purpose. 
The graphs below provide a summary of loan supply at the surveyed RCCs. 
 
Figure 3.1: Above 60% Borrowers and Lenders Received/Approved Full Loan Amount 
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Both lenders and borrowers agree that the majority (above 60%) of loan applications were fully 
awarded. 
 
Figure 3.2: Borrowers Obtain Loans More Frequently from Relatives and Friends than from RCC 
 
 
While borrowers are eager for liquidity from all possible sources, including formal and informal, 
public and private, they are actually only able to borrow heavily from informal sources including friends 
and relatives (above 50 percent loans are from the two informal sources as shown in Figure 3.2 above).  
Lenders, however, assume borrowers view their RCCs as the top priority for liquidity, while assigning 
similar prioritization to different financial institutions. 
 
Figure 3.3: Majority of RCC Loans are for Agriculture and Housing Use 
 
81.7 82.5 
95.0 
77.5 76.7 80.8 73.5 
68.7 
59.8 56.6 54.2 
0.0 
53.3 
35.9 
17.1 
3.6 1.0 0.0 
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0
Relative Friend RCC Bank Loan
Shark
Other
Loan
Frequency of attitudes (%) 
Sources of borrowing for farm households 
Lender prioritize Borrower preference Borrower actual
85.8 84.2 
41.7 40.0 
80.0 
25.8 
38.3 
30.8 
57.5 
40.5 
3.0 2.2 
8.6 
25.0 
6.0 6.0 3.9 4.7 
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
farm operation agricultural
machines
non-agriculural
machines
family living
consumption
housing health education wedding others
Frequency of attitudes (%) Major use of loans for farm households 
Lender Borrower
23 
 
 
Lenders and borrowers basically agree that the majority of loans to farm households were used 
for farm operations, followed by other purposes, including housing and consumption.  Lenders also 
believe the majority of the loans were used to purchase agricultural machines, while borrowers indicate 
that this was minor. 
 
CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Disconnect observed from mean scoring 
The mean scoring method gives us an accurate, consistent, and immediate idea how a typical 
lender or borrower places his or her opinion among a set of attitudinal answers.  We calculate the mean 
score as follows: 
Mean score = � 𝑖×𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝑖)5𝑖=1
100
 - ∑ 𝑖
5
𝑖=1
5
, 
where i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, represents scores assigned for the attitude of “strongly disagree” “disagree” 
“agree” “moderately agree” and “strongly agree”, respectively. 
 
For illustration, for the question “If your farm household borrower is a member of a Group 
Guarantee, you will lend him/her a larger loan than other borrowers could get, because of his/her Group 
Guarantee membership?”, we rank the three attitudinal answers as: “1. strongly disagree” “2. disagree” “3. 
agree” “4. moderately agree” and “5. strongly agree”.  Mean score for this lender is calculated by 1) 
taking the sum product of the scores 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and the valid percentage for each of the corresponding 
ranking: 15.0, 72.5, 6.7, 5.0, and 0.8 , 2) divided by 100, and 3) minus the mean of the three scores, which 
equals sum of the five scores divided by the number of scores, 3 = (1+2+3+4+5)/5 in this question.  This 
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gives a mean score of - 0.95833 for this question, which we interpret as an average lender (out of the 120 
surveyed) strongly disagrees that he or she will lend the borrower a larger loan because the borrower joins 
a Group Guarantee. 
For simplicity, we group the survey questions to lenders with the corresponding questions to 
borrowers into ten sets of dimensions, denoted as “a, b, ..,, f”, to measure their attitudes within separate 
concepts.  We interpret each question group as below (significance test results attached in Appendix). 
a. Care 
As shown in Figure 4.1, we find few significant disagreements between lenders and borrowers in 
this group regarding lenders' and their RCCs' attitudes towards lending.  While lenders are fairly 
confident that RCCs lend sufficient amounts of money to farm households for farming and business 
purposes (scoring 0.74), the borrowing households appear to hold a strongly opposite view (scoring -1.01, 
representing a gap of 1.75, p=0.000).  Both lenders and borrowers disagree that RCCs lend needed 
amount of money for consumption, education, and healthcare purposes either, but borrowers' views again 
appear to be much stronger (scoring -1.02 as opposed to -0.24 for lenders, representing a gap of 0.78, 
p=0.001).  Borrowers also disagree that they could find suitable channels for help or complain if the 
financial services provided by RCCs are not satisfactory (scoring -0.39), nor do they agree with their 
lenders that RCCs care about them and their households (scoring -0.31), or that RCCs' loan products are 
flexible enough to meet their ability to repay when they sell products at harvest (scoring -0.35), while 
lenders tend to agree on the three questions (scoring 0.98, 1.28, and 0.32 respectively, representing a gap 
of 1.37, 1.59, and 0.67 respectively, with P values of 0.000, 0.000, and 0.000 respectively).  More 
interestingly, when asked about their views towards how borrowers might think of them viewing these 
questions, lenders' answers are highly consistent with previous answers which are positive (scoring 0.91, 
1.11, and 0.48, respectively).  I therefore conclude that a strong disconnect exists between the two groups, 
in contrast with lenders' views being constant towards borrowers, as well as towards themselves being 
viewed by borrowers. 
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Both agree that RCCs are doing well in their lending practices (scoring 0.58 for borrowers, 0.93 
and 0.89 for lenders and lenders towards borrowers view themselves, representing a 0.35 gap between 
borrowers and lenders, p=0.002) and services (scoring 0.63 for borrowers, 1.13 and 1.05 for lenders and 
lenders' reversed questions, representing a 0.5 gap, p=0.000).  Furthermore, both agree that there should 
be at least one Government regulated source of agricultural credit dedicated to providing loans to farming 
despite fluctuations of the agricultural economy (scoring 0.66 for borrowers and 0.47 for lenders, 
representing a gap of 0.19, p =0.144 for t-test and 0.193 for non-parametric test). 
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Figure 4.1: Disconnect on RCCs’ Care about Farm Households Well-Being and Agriculture 
 
Note: Highlighted pair is NOT significant by t-test and U-test at the .05 level. 
Figure 4.2: “RCC Cares”: Lenders Agree and Think Borrowers Agree, while Borrowers Disagree 
 
Note: Both pairs are significant by t-test and U-test at the .05 level. 
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Both groups agree that the lenders view agriculture/farming as being crucial (scoring 0.34 for 
borrowers, 0.98 and 0.89 for lenders and reversed, respectively), representing a gap of 0.68 (p=0.000).  
While results show slight disagreement among borrowers on RCCs' care towards farmers' well-being 
(scoring -0.04), lenders are very confident that their RCC cares about the borrower and his/her household 
(scoring 1.37, representing a 1.41 gap with borrowers, p=0.000), and that borrowers would agree with this 
view (scoring 0.98).  In comparison with the strong agreement displayed among lenders that RCCs will 
provide loans to agriculture even when there is a downturn in the agricultural economy (scoring 0.68), 
slight disagreement once again is shown among borrowers (scoring -0.05, representing a 0.73 gap, 
p=0.000). 
In terms of RCC branching strategies, borrowers highly agree that it is a good idea to allow urban 
or city banks to set up bank branches in rural areas (scoring 0.84), while lenders are much less inclined to 
agree (scoring 0.07, representing a 0.77 gap, p=0.000).  Both agree that it is good idea to encourage banks 
and RCCs to set up more ATMs, POS, as well as mobile banking, in rural areas (scoring 1.04 for 
borrowers and 1.44 for lenders, representing a 0.4 gap, p=0.000). 
In summary, more extensive marketing efforts should be conducted by local RCCs to deliver to 
customers the notion that, as the loan supplier, they indeed care about farm households’ well-being and 
about agriculture in particular, to mitigate the gap in their perceptions as indicated in Figure 4.2. 
 
b. Loan rejection 
As suggested by Figure 4.3, a disagreement exists on borrowers’ repayment record, when the two 
groups were asked the reasons that lenders reject a loan, or that borrowers being rejected a loan.  While 
borrowers strongly disagree (scoring -0.50) that disapproval of their loan applications is due to past 
failures in repayment, lenders hold equally strong agreement on this argument (scoring 0.50, representing 
a gap of 1.0, p=0.000). 
While the two groups disagree that a loan rejection results from reasons such as whether the farm 
household grows crops that are vulnerable to the extreme weather (borrower -0.50, lender -0.08, 
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representing a 0.42 gap, p=0.000), both agree on the item regarding insufficient collateral (borrower 0.23, 
lender 0.33, representing a 0.1 gap, P=0.130 for T test, and 0.129 for Non-parametric test).  Furthermore, 
both groups appear to hold different attitudes regarding other reasons for loan rejection, such as lack of a 
guarantee (borrower -0.07, lender 0.26, a 0.33 gap, p=0.002), mismatch between RCC loan repayment 
schedules and the timing of farm product sales (borrower -0.50, lender 0.02, representing a 0.52 gap, 
p=0.000), borrower trustworthiness (borrower -0.29 and lender 0.11, with a 0.4 gap, p=0.014), ability to 
earn enough income (borrower -0.36, lender 0.07, with a 0.43 gap, p=0.000), and the risks associated with 
crops price (borrower -0.50, lender 0.18, with a 0.68 gap, p=0.000) and yield (borrower -0.21, lender 0.13, 
with a 0.34 gap, P=0.164 for T-test, and 0.163 for Non-parametric).  In general, borrowers agree on a 
majority of the surveyed reasons, while lenders generally disagree. 
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Figure 4.3: Disconnect on Borrower Repayment Record: Distrust of Lender 
 
Note: Highlighted pairs are NOT significant by t-test and U-test at the .05 level. 
 
Figure 4.4: Similar Attitudes between Borrowers in Shangdong and Shannxi: Borrowers are 
Overconfident about Their Repayment Record 
 
Note:  
a. Highlighted pairs are NOT significant by t-test and U-test at the .05 level. 
b. For this set of questions on loan rejections, we only obtain 14 valid observations for borrowers in 
Shandong.  To ensure that the results from paring is representative, we use a prior identical 
survey to farm households in Shannxi (602 valid observations out of 897 surveyed households) 
and compare with responses from Shandong borrowers.  As shown in Figure 4.4., borrowers have 
similar negative attitudes for most of the listed reasons for a loan rejection, except for the reason 
that the borrower has insufficient collateral, for which households in Shandong have positive 
attitudes whereas households in Shannxi hold negative attitudes. 
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In summary, we observe a radical disconnect in lenders’ and borrowers’ views towards reasons 
for loan rejection, and in particular in their understanding of borrowers’ repayment records, as highlighted 
in Figure 4.3.  Consistent with Turvey and Kong (2009), the results suggests that farmers do understand 
their credit worthiness relies upon repayment but they tend to be casual in timing of repayment.  Hence, 
the RCC may be wise to advertise good credit worthiness practices among rural household customers.  
We also suggest that RCCs provide loan contracts with clearly stated terms, and perhaps more flexible 
terms regarding the timing of payments throughout the year, and that loan officers provide instructions on 
reading contracts to farm household borrowers. 
Table 4.1: Chinese Farmers are for the Most Part Honest 
 
To ensure generalization of our interpretation on the Shandong results for this specific set of 
questions on loan rejection, for which we pair 14 valid borrower data points against 103 valid lender data 
points, we compare Shandong borrowers’ answers with a previous identical survey conducted among 897 
rural households in Shannxi province (with 602 data points being valid) and find that, as shown in Figure 
4.4, other than for the “insufficient collateral” item, , the two groups of borrowers hold similar 
disagreements, even though in various degrees for each specific reason proposed, on all remaining 
reasons of loan rejection.  We hence believe the interpretation drawn from Shandong is representative. 
  
Ever Been Late Ever Defaulted
No Yes No Yes
loan from friends 71.10% 28.90% 98.90% 1.10%
loan  from relatives 61.90% 38.10% 96.00% 4.00%
loan from Community Mutual Fund/Loan 99.80% 0.20% 100.00% 0.00%
 loan  from NGO 99.70% 0.30% 100.00% 0.00%
 loan  from Money Lenders 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
 loan  from Pawn Shop 99.70% 0.30% 100.00% 0.00%
 loan  from RCC (including Rural 
Commercial Banks, Rural Cooperative 
Bank etc 81.80% 18.20% 99.30% 0.70%
 loan  from ABC 98.60% 1.40% 100.00% 0.00%
 loan  from Postal Savings 99.80% 0.20% 100.00% 0.00%
 loan  from Commercial bank other than 
RCC, ABC, Postal Savings 99.00% 1.00% 100.00% 0.00%
 loan  from Credit Only Loan Company 
(non-deposit) Institution 99.80% 0.20% 100.00% 0.00%
 Other loan   99.80% 0.20% 100.00% 0.00%
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Figure 4.5: Disconnect on Borrower Creditworthiness: Lenders’ Distrust towards Borrowers 
 
Note: All the four pairs are significant by t-test and U-test at the .05 level. 
a. Lenders are ABSOLUTELY firm that the borrower has previously failed to repay a loan, 
while borrowers are EQUALLY firm that they never default on a loan.  This gap in their perceptions, as 
we understand, is due to their different understanding towards “default” and “late payment”. 
b. More than 50 percent of lenders reject a loan application because they do not trust the 
borrower’s ability to earn enough income, while 86 percent of borrowers disagree. 
c. More than 60 percent of lenders reject a loan application because they do not believe the 
borrower is trustworthy, while 79 percent of borrowers object. 
d. While more than 50 percent of borrowers respond that they take their personal credit very 
seriously, only 32 percent of lenders agree and another 28 percent of lenders believe the borrower does 
not perceive their personal credit as important. 
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c. Member of group guarantee 
When asked about the importance of group guarantee membership in loan approvals, lenders have 
negative attitudes in every regard, while borrowers have positive attitudes, as suggested by Figure 4.6.  
The survey results suggest that lenders disagree on the role that group guarantee membership plays in 
their decisions to offer loan approval (lender -0.53 while borrower 0.84, a 1.37 gap, p=0.000), to approve 
larger loan amounts (lender -0.96 while borrower 0.40, a 1.36 gap, p=0.000), to approve larger loan 
amounts due to the borrower having secured a group guarantee (lender -0.54 while borrower 0.45, a 0.99 
gap, p=0.000), and to offer lower interest rates (lender -0.74 while borrower 0.06, a 0.8 gap, p=0.000).  
These results may be explained by their insights on lending regulations provided in interviews.  The loan 
interest rates are decided and regulated by the PBOC (although RCCs do have limited flexibility to decide 
the rate), and most recently, whether loan officers approve a loan largely depends on the loan to deposit 
ratio (LDR) of their RCC.  By CBRC regulation, RCCs must ensure a maximum 75% LDR on a daily 
basis, and surveyed Shandong loan officers indicated that their RCCs adjust LDR on a daily basis to 
maintain a constant 70% level16. 
 
Figure 4.6: Group Guarantee is NOT as Important in Lenders’ View 
 
Note: All pairs are significant by t-test and U-test at the .05 level. 
 
                                                          
16 Per our interviews with loan officers in Chengwu County during Session 1 on Sep 5, 2011. 
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In summary, borrowers generally agree about the importance of group guarantees, while RCC 
lenders do not.  We conclude that RCCs need to make marketing efforts to ease the concern of credit 
rationed borrowers about group guarantee requirement. 
d. Non-member of group guarantee 
As shown in Figure 4.7, when asked about the reason that a borrower not being a member of a 
Group Guarantee, the two groups disagree on the proposed reason that the borrower has sufficient 
collateral to obtain a loan, with agreement displayed among lenders (scoring 0.22) in contrast to the 
strong disagreement observed among borrowers (scoring -1.14, representing a 1.36 gap, p=0.000).  
Consistent agreements were shown between the two groups on the proposed reason that the borrower 
does not want to guarantee someone else's debt (lender 0.20 and borrower 0.28, representing a 0.48 gap, P 
= 0.193 for T-test and 0.788 for Non-parametric test).  They appear to disagree, in a consistent manner, on 
the proposed reason that the procedures of joining a Group Guarantee are too bothersome (lender -0.51 
and borrower -0.83, representing a 0.32 gap, p=0.000). 
 
Figure 4.7: Farmers are NOT Willing to Guarantee Someone Else’s Debt 
 
Note: Highlighted pair is NOT significant by t-test and U-test at the .05 level. 
 
Summary: Borrowers see it as being more difficult to join a group guarantee to satisfy RCC 
requirements.  Combined with results in the previous “loan rejection” section, we conclude that the reason 
for borrowers not being a guarantee group member is that farmers do not want to guarantee someone 
else’s debt, while it’s also hard to find a counterparty farm household to form a guarantee group.  We 
recommend RCCs, and more likely the agricultural banking regulators, to educate farmers and ease the 
tension of credit risk arising from group guarantee.  
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e. Lending concerns 
We observe opposite yet strong views from the two groups in a few aspects on lenders' concerns 
when they make lending decisions, as suggested by Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9.  While the lenders strongly 
agree (scoring 0.86) that they are concerned about borrowers' unpaid debts on previous loans from RCC 
or banks, as well as borrowers not being willing to have to guarantee another villager's debts (scoring 
0.38), borrowers strongly disagree on these concern of lenders (scoring -1.17 and -0.40 respectively, 
representing gaps of 2.03 and 0.78, with p value of 0.000 for each). 
While little concern is observed among lenders that borrowers could not find someone to provide 
a third-party individual guarantee (scoring -0.23), and that interest rates on RCC or bank loans are higher 
than interest rates that a farm household could obtain from friends or relatives (scoring -0.29), that 
borrowers prefer to (scoring -1.05), and find it easier to borrow from friends and relatives (-0.02), as well 
as that borrowers do not like to be indebted to RCCs and banks (-0.04), borrowers appear to have more 
agreements on these issues (scoring 0.47, 0.76, 1.15, 1.17, and 0.90, respectively, representing a gap of 
0.7, 1.05, 2.2, 1.19, and 0.94, respectively, with p values of 0.005 for the first question and 0.000 for each 
of the remaining four questions). 
The two groups both have positive attitudes on proposed lender concerns such as borrowers' 
family culture is to borrow as little as possible (lender 0.13 and borrower 0.99, representing a 0.86 gap, 
p=0.000), and that the farm household does not own the collateral to get a loan (lender 0.27 borrower 0.67, 
representing a 0.4 gap, P=0.202 for T-test and 0.330 for Non-parametric).  They both have negative 
attitudes on proposed concerns such as lenders do not consider the borrower being "credit-worthy" (lender 
-0.04 borrower -0.71, representing a 0.67 gap, p=0.000), the borrower does not want to ask another 
villager to sign a group guarantee (lender -0.18, borrower -0.22, representing a 0.04 gap, p=0.003), the 
borrower considers the process of getting a group guarantee too cumbersome/difficult (lender -0.31 
borrower -0.98, representing a 0.67 gap, p=0.000), interest rates on RCC or bank loans being higher than 
a farm household is able to pay (lender -0.28 borrower -0.66, representing 0.38 gap, p=0.020), RCCs are 
located too far for borrowers to travel (lender -0.96 borrower -1.49, representing a 0.53 gap, p=0.000), 
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RCCs require too much paper work (lender -1.32 borrower -1.14, representing a 0.18 gap, p=0.001), 
RCCs take too long in approving a loan (lender -0.09 borrower -1.09, representing a 1.0 gap, p=0.000), or 
require a bribe to approve a loan (lender -0.36 borrower -0.86, representing a 0.5 gap, p=0.000), and that 
farm households prefer to borrow from money lenders (lender -0.03 borrower -1.49, representing a 1.46, 
p=0.000), or borrowers prefer supplier credit than borrowing a loan (lender -0.14 borrower -0.39, 
representing a 0.53 gap, P=0.569 for T-test and 0.131 for Non-parametric test). 
Summary: Borrowers find it easier to obtain a loan from informal sources such as relatives and 
friends than from RCCs, in terms of both loan application procedures and the cost of borrowing.  We 
advise that RCCs educate front-line officers in providing standardized loan approving procedures, and in 
educating borrowers in understanding loan terms. 
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Figure 4.8: Borrowers Favor Credit from Informal Sources: Friends and Relatives in Particular 
 
Note: Highlighted pairs are NOT significant by t-test and U-test at the .05 level. 
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Figure 4.9: Disconnect on Lending Concerns: Easier to Borrow from Friends and Relatives than 
from RCC or Bank 
 
  Note: Other than the pair in e, all other pairs are significant by t-test and U-test at the .05 level. 
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f. Cost of borrowing 
Agreement is observed among both groups that a decrease in cost of borrowing, including loan 
interest rates (lenders scored 0.76 and borrowers 0.70, representing a 0.06 gap, P=0.367 for T-test and 
0.609 for Non-parametric test), and fees to a less extent in the lenders' view (lenders scored 0.23 while 
borrowers 0.73, representing a 0.5 gap, p=0.000), would lead to increase in borrowers' willingness to 
borrow from RCCs and banks, as we observe in Figure 4.10. 
 
Figure 4.10: Reducing Costs of Borrowing Will Enlarge Credit Access to Farm Households 
 
Note: Highlighted pair is NOT significant by t-test and U-test at the .05 level. 
 
Summary: Both groups agree that reducing the cost of borrowing will enlarge credit access to 
farm households.  Since RCCs are regulated by the CBRC to lend at a range of rates set by the PBOC and 
have limited flexibility to adjust that cost of borrowing, we advise RCCs work on cost reduction within 
the institutions, in administration expenses particularly, to provide room for reducing costs involved in 
loan approvals. 
g. Reason for default 
We observe consensus from the two groups on all questions with regards to the cause of borrower 
default, as indicated in Figure 4.11.  Agreement is displayed among the two groups on causes including 
lack of financial resources (lender 0.23 and borrower 0.66, representing a 0.43 gap, p=0.001), borrower 
suffered crop loss or cattle loss (lender 0.47 and borrower 0.60, representing a 0.13 gap, P = 0.435 for T-
test and 0.155 for Non-parametric test), or suffered death or major sickness of a family member (lender 
0.55 and borrower 0.47, representing a 0.08 gap, P=0.571 for T-test and 0.855 for Non-parametric test).  
Disagreements (lenders less stronger than borrower) were observed among the two groups on causes 
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including terms of loan contract not being clear (lender -0.59 and borrower -1.16, representing a 0.57 gap, 
p=0.000), borrowers diverted the loan for other purpose (lender -0.13 and borrower -0.70, representing a 
0.83 gap, p=0.000), and that the borrower believes it could be profitable to default on a loan (lender -0.54 
and borrower -1.39, representing a 0.85 gap, p=0.000). 
 
Figure 4.11: Disconnect on Reasons for Default: Loan Contract and Terms should be Standardized 
 
Note: Highlighted pairs are NOT significant by t-test and U-test at the .05 level. 
 
Summary: Borrowers have stronger agreement on past or future default resulting from lack of 
financial recourses, and natural reasons including crop or cattle loss, and death or major sickness of a 
family member.  Strong attitudinal differences are observed for those questions where both groups hold 
disagreements, on various degrees.  Borrowers hold much stronger disagreements than disagreeing 
lenders on reasons including terms of contract not being clear, borrowers diverted the loan for other 
purpose, and that borrowers believe it could be profitable to default on a loan.  We suggest RCCs train 
lenders, again, in giving clear and standardized instructions to farm households upon loan approval, with 
emphasis on terms, the use of loan, and the procedure of servicing a loan through maturity. 
h. Credit rationing (Bester). 
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We include two separate sets of questions on credit rationing, based on Bester’s paper on the 
tradeoff between interest rates and collateral, and with more emphasis on collateral (Bester, 1985) and 
Stiglitz and Weiss’ papers that emphasize more on adverse selection (1981) and moral hazard (1983). 
In Figure 4.12, disagreements were observed among both groups on the proposed condition 
where the lender will lend a higher loan (lender -0.36 and borrower -1.09, representing a 0.73 gap, 
p=0.000), and even at a lower interest rates (lender -0.76 and borrower -0.95, representing a 0.19 gap, 
P=0.125 for T-test and 0.114 for Non-parametric test), to the borrower who owns more assets, without 
collateralizing the borrower's assets.  We observe agreement among lenders on the same issue but under 
the condition that only if the borrower uses the assets as collateral (scoring 0.25).  In this regard, 
borrowers tend to agree (scoring 0.59, representing a 0.34 gap, p=0.024), while they appear to hold strong 
disagreement that even with their assets being collateralized, they cannot obtain a lower interest rates for 
the higher loan (borrower -0.75 while lender 0.07, representing a 0.82 gap, p=0.000). 
 
Figure 4.12: Lenders and Borrowers Agree on Roles of Various Loan Terms 
 
Note: Highlighted pair is NOT significant by t-test and U-test at the .05 level. 
 
Summary: Both groups point out the limited flexibility in interest rates when RCCs approve a 
loan.  Both agree on the importance of using borrowers’ assets, including land user rights or home 
ownership, as collateral, to qualify for a higher loan amount. 
i. Credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss) 
1 389
2 385
3 387
4 386
Will you lend a higher loan to a borrower who owns more assets (land user 
rights/home ownership, etc.) without using the assets for collateral? 
Will you lend a higher loan to a borrower who owns more assets (land user 
rights/home ownership, etc.) but only if he/she uses the assets as collateral?
Will you lend a higher loan to a borrower who owns more assets (land user 
rights/home ownership, etc.) at a lower interest rates, without using the 
assets as collateral?
Will you lend a higher loan to a borrower who owns more assets (land user 
rights/home ownership, etc.) at a lower interest rates, but only if he/she uses 
the assets as collateral? 
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In Figure 4.13, we observe disagreements among lenders and borrowers on how other borrowers' 
default (lender -0.43 and borrower -0.18, representing a 0.25 gap, p=0.11) or misuse of loans (lender -
0.07 and borrower -0.11, representing a 0.04 gap, P=0.783 for T-test and 0.721 for Non-parametric test) 
would affect lending to an honest borrower.  Both disagree, while the borrowers hold much stronger 
disagreement, that they are willing to pay a higher interest rate to obtain the needed amount of loan 
(lender -0.47 and borrower -0.67, representing a 0.2 gap, P=0.127 for T-test and 0.170 for Non-parametric 
test). 
 
Figure 4.13: Lenders and Borrowers Agree on Potential Credit Rationing 
Note: Highlighted pairs are NOT significant by t-test and U-test at the .05 level. 
 
With regards to whether the borrower is more likely to VOLUNTARITY default on a loan of 
either higher loan amount (lender 0.19 and borrower 0.29, representing a 0.1 gap, P=0.881 for T-test and 
0.665 for Non-parametric), or higher interest rate (lender 0.14 and borrower 0.41, representing a 0.27 gap, 
P=0.510 for T-test and 0.537 for Non-parametric), the two groups both agree in general, while the 
borrower tends to give stronger views. 
Summary: Lenders and borrowers agree on potential reasons for default, to various extents 
though; meanwhile, we do not observe any substantial difference in their understanding towards voluntary 
default. 
j. Lending preference 
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to obtain the needed amount of loan? 
Do you believe that a borrower who accepts a loan that is very high relative to 
his/her assets is more likely to VOLUNTARILY default on that loan?  
Do you believe that a borrower who accepts a loan at a higher interest rate is 
more likely to VOLUNTARILY default on that loan? 
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In terms of lenders' criteria to prioritize a loan approval, both groups strongly agree on the 
borrower's ability to repay (lender 1.63 and borrower 1.40, representing a 0.23 gap, p=0.001).  We also 
observe certain agreement (scoring 0.42) among borrowers on their social connections, on which slight 
agreement (scoring 0.03, representing a 0.39 gap, p=0.000) is shown among lenders. 
When asked about government related issues such as the borrower's Party membership, both lenders and 
borrowers disagree on their role played in lenders’ loan approving decisions (lender -0.42 and borrower -
0.60, representing a 0.18 gap, P=0.764 for T-test and 0.415 for Non-parametric test); similar disagreement 
holds for their connection to the government (lender -0.71 and borrower -0.17, representing a 0.54 gap, 
p=0.000). 
 
Figure 4.14: Ability to Repay is the First Principle Requirement in Loan Approval 
 
Note: Highlighted pair is NOT significant by t-test and U-test at the .05 level. 
 
Summary: Both groups agree that the borrower’s ability to repay a loan is the first principle 
requirement in loan approval, rather than secondary criteria such as the borrower’s social connections, 
Party membership, or connection to the government. 
 
4.2 Segmentations of borrowers and lenders obtained from cluster analysis 
With the cluster analysis on a set of selected perception questions, we herein examine the 
segmentations among Shandong lenders and borrowers, and explain the judgmental biases observed in 
each cluster membership.  
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4.2.1 Borrower clusters 
We obtain four clusters for Shandong household borrowers, with each representing a different 
degree of agreement on their attitudes towards services and products provided by local rural credit 
cooperatives.  As shown in Table 4.2, we define the four borrower clusters as follows based on their 
individual attributes measured by mean and median scores: 
Cluster 1: “Uncaring” customers. This borrower cluster (n=5) has identical mean and median 
scores for all the questions upon which the cluster membership was decided. Customers in this cluster 
may not borrow as much from RCCs since they give the lowest scores among the four clusters for the 
questions that ask whether the borrower perceive that “local RCC or Bank cares about the welfare of 
farmers” “local RCC or Bank cares about me and my household” “loan products from RCC or Bank are 
flexible enough” “local RCC or Bank will provide loans to agriculture even when there is a downturn in 
the agricultural economy”, and they can “find suitable channels to get help or to file complaints if not 
satisfied with the financial services provided by the RCC or Bank”, as well as their ability to borrow 
needed amount of money from RCC for all different uses. We therefore define these 5 customers as being 
“uncaring”. 
Cluster 2: “Betweeners”. This borrower cluster (n=85) has similar mean and median scores 
except for the question that asks whether the  borrower can find suitable channels to get help or to file 
complaints if he or she is not satisfied with the financial services provided by the RCC or Bank, for which 
the median (4.00) is much higher than the mean (3.20), and the two questions that ask whether the 
borrower is able to borrow needed amount of money from Banks or RCC for consumption, education and 
health purposes, as well as for farming and business purposes, where the means (1.98 and 2.03 
respectively) are much higher than the medians (1.00 and 1.00 respectively). We label customers in this 
cluster as in-betweeners since on average, the scores are roughly between Cluster 3 and Cluster 4 which 
represent the lowest and highest scores across the 4 clusters. 
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Cluster 3: Dissatisfied customers. This borrower cluster (n=62) has similar mean and median 
scores for all questions asked. This cluster has the lowest scores among the four clusters for all questions 
other than the two that ask the borrower whether allowing urban or city banks to set up bank branches in 
rural areas is a good idea, and that whether encouraging banks or RCCs to set up more ATMs, POS, 
cellphone banking in rural areas is a good idea, for which the dissatisfied customers in Cluster 3 give 
higher scores than the Pro-RCC customers that we will discuss shortly. 
Cluster 4: Pro-RCC customers. This borrower cluster (n=80) has similar mean and median scores 
except for the two questions that ask whether the borrower perceive local the local RCC or Bank views 
agriculture/farming as being important, and that ask whether the borrower perceive the local RCC or 
Bank cares about the welfare of farmers, where both means (4.04 and 3.66 respectively) are higher than 
the medians (5.00 and 5.00 respectively). We label customers in Cluster 4 as being Pro-RCC since they 
give the highest scores for all the questions except for the two that ask the borrower whether having more 
bank branches of urban or city banks, and more ATMs, POS, and cellphone banking from banks or RCCs 
is a good idea, where the Pro-RCC customers give the lowest scores. 
Based on the observations, we further group the four clusters into two groups, with one group 
representing the credit rationed borrowers (Cluster 1, 2, and 3 combined), and Cluster 4 representing the 
borrowers who are not credit rationed.  While the credit rationed borrowers appear to hold attitudes of 
general disagreement and occasional, moderate agreement on that they are satisfied with the lending 
practices and services provided by the RCC or Bank, that local RCC or Bank cares about the welfare of 
them and their households, and that local RCC or Bank will provide loans to agriculture even when there 
is a downturn in the agricultural economy, as well as that it is a good idea to allow urban or city banks to 
set up bank branches and more ATMs, POS, and cellphone banking in rural areas, the group that is not 
credit rationed seem to hold strong agreement in these regards. 
We do not observe obvious segmentations among borrowers on questions regarding whether local 
RCC or Bank views agriculture/farming as being important. 
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A strong attitudinal clash was observed between the two groups of borrowers on their ability to 
borrow needed amount of money from Banks or RCC for farming and business purposes and 
consumption, education and health purposes.  While the credit rationed group responded with strong 
disagreement, the other group appear to agree in these two aspects. 
We observe similar degrees of attitudes between two borrower groups on a few questions.  Both 
groups tend to disagree that loan products from local RCC or bank are flexible enough to meet their 
ability to repay when they sell their products/at harvest, and disagree that they can find suitable channels 
to get help or to file complaints if they are not satisfied with the financial services provided by the RCC or 
Bank.  Borrowers also tend to hold moderate agreement that there should be at least one Government 
regulated source of agricultural credit dedicated to providing loans to farming whether the agricultural 
economy is good or bad. 
Do farmers not receiving credit resent RCC? There is a clear discourse between farmers who are 
not rationed and those who are rationed to some extent.  Rationing has a residual effect on the psyche of 
farmers leading them to believe that lenders do not care about them or agriculture.  As a strategic 
objective RCC lenders may do well by explaining to farmers why loans were denied and indicating how 
farmers can improve credit worthiness to obtain loans in the future.  Extension efforts targeted to 
unqualified borrowers would improve the image of rural lenders. 
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Figure 4.15: Four Clusters of Borrowers with Distinct Attitudes towards RCC Lenders 
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Table 4.2: Attributes of Four Borrower Clusters 
 
TwoStep Cluster Number 
1 2 3 4 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Local RCC or Bank views agriculture/farming as 
being important. 
3.00 3.00 3.82 4.00 2.65 2.50 4.04 5.00 
Local RCC or Bank cares about the welfare of 
farmers. 
2.00 2.00 3.64 4.00 2.38 2.00 3.66 5.00 
Local RCC or Bank cares about me and my 
household 
2.00 2.00 3.05 3.00 2.12 2.00 3.60 4.00 
Loan products from my local RCC or Bank are 
flexible enough to meet my ability to repay when I 
sell my products/at harvest etc 
2.00 2.00 3.46 4.00 2.31 2.00 2.45 2.00 
Local RCC or Bank will provide loans to agriculture 
even when there is a downturn in the agricultural 
economy 
2.00 2.00 3.51 4.00 2.22 2.00 3.94 4.00 
Satisfied with the lending practices of my  RCC or 
Bank 
4.00 4.00 3.99 4.00 2.31 2.00 4.33 5.00 
Satisfied with the services provided by my  RCC or 
Bank 
4.00 4.00 4.01 4.00 2.29 2.00 4.55 5.00 
I can find suitable channels to get help or to file 
complaints if I am not satisfied with the financial 
services provided by my RCC or Bank 
2.00 2.00 3.20 4.00 2.18 2.00 2.82 2.00 
There should be at least one Government 
regulated source of agricultural credit  dedicated to 
providing loans to farming whether the agricultural 
economy is good or bad.  
4.00 4.00 3.96 4.00 2.95 3.00 3.83 4.00 
Allowing urban or city banks to set up bank 
branches in rural areas is a good idea 
4.00 4.00 4.16 4.00 3.44 4.00 3.70 3.00 
Encouraging banks or RCCs to set up more ATMs, 
POS, cellphone banking in rural areas is a good 
idea 
5.00 5.00 3.89 4.00 3.54 3.50 3.91 4.00 
Able to borrow needed amount of money from 
Banks or RCC for consumption, education and 
health purposes 
1.00 1.00 1.98 1.00 1.93 2.00 3.11 3.00 
Able to borrow needed amount of money from 
Banks or RCC for farming and business purposes 
1.00 1.00 2.03 1.00 1.78 2.00 3.24 3.00 
 
Note: We define the four borrower clusters as follows based on their individual attributes: 
Cluster 1: “Uncaring” customers (n=5) 
Cluster 2: “Betweeners” (n=85) 
Cluster 3: Dissatisfied customers (n=62) 
Cluster 4: Pro-RCC customers (n=80)   
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4.2.2 Lender clusters 
We obtain two clusters for Shandong RCC lenders, as shown in Figure 4.16. Based on the 
attributes of each, as shown in Table 4.3, we label them as follows: 
Cluster 1: Indifferent lenders (n=65), with similar mean and median scores for all questions. 
Lenders in this cluster tend to be less pro-agriculture and have other lending preferences beyond farm 
households, as they give on average lower scores for all the questions than lenders in Cluster 2, except for 
the two questions that ask whether the lender thinks it is a good idea to allow urban or city banks to set up 
bank branches in rural areas, and to encourage banks and RCCs to set up more ATMs, POS, and mobile 
banking. 
Cluster 2: Farmer-friendly lenders (n=55), with similar mean and median scores for all questions. 
Lenders in Cluster 2 tend to be pro-agriculture and are friendly to farm households, as we observe their 
scores are higher than Cluster 1 in all regards, except for the two questions regarding encouraging more 
branches to be set up by their competitors, where they give lower scores than lenders in Cluster 1. 
Based on these observations, we therefore suggest the RCCs to train a team of lenders who 
specifically dedicate to farm household retail loans and separate their services from the broader 
agriculture related credit supply, to serve farm households customers exclusively. 
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Figure 4.16: Two Clusters of Lenders with Similar Attitudes towards RCC Borrowers 
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Table 4.3: Attributes of Two Lender Clusters 
  
TwoStep Cluster Number 
1 2 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Do you think that agriculture/farming is crucial? 3.69 4.00 4.33 4.00 
Your RCC cares about the well-being of farmers 3.98 4.00 4.82 5.00 
Your RCC cares about the borrower and his/her 
household 
4.00 4.00 4.62 5.00 
Do you think your RCC provides loan products that are 
flexible enough to meet farmers’ ability to repay when they 
sell their products/at harvest etc.? 
2.89 3.00 3.82 4.00 
Your RCC will provide loans to agriculture even when 
there is a downturn in the agricultural economy 
3.11 3.00 4.35 4.00 
Do you think your RCC is doing well in the lending 
practices? 
3.55 4.00 4.38 4.00 
Do you think your RCC is doing well in the services it 
provides? 
3.77 4.00 4.56 5.00 
Do you think borrowers can find suitable channels to get 
help or to file complaints if he/she is not satisfied with the 
financial services provided by your RCC? 
3.77 4.00 4.22 4.00 
Do you think that there should be at least one Government 
regulated source of agricultural credit dedicated to 
providing loans to farming, whether the agricultural 
economy is good or bad? 
3.58 4.00 3.33 4.00 
Do you think that it is a good idea to allow urban or city 
banks to set up bank branches in rural areas? 
3.15 3.00 2.96 3.00 
Do you think that it is a good idea to encourage banks and 
RCCs to set up more ATMs, POS, as well as mobile 
banking, in rural areas? 
4.20 4.00 4.73 5.00 
Do you think farmers could obtain needed amount of 
money from Banks or RCCs for consumption, education 
and healthcare purposes? 
2.48 2.00 3.09 3.00 
Do you think farmers could obtain needed amount of 
money from Banks or RCCs for farming and business 
purposes? 
3.52 4.00 4.00 4.00 
 
Note: We define the two lender clusters as follows based on their individual attributes: 
Cluster 1: Indifferent lenders (n=65) 
Cluster 2: Farmer-friendly lenders (n=55) 
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4.3 Shandong borrowers 
To assess the influence of demographics on the four borrower cluster membership, I run 
discriminant analysis together with regressions to examine these aspects. 
4.3.1 Discriminant analysis: summary of canonical discriminant functions 
 
Table 4.4: Borrower Discriminant Analysis: Eigenvalues 
Eigenvalues 
Function Eigenvalue 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
Canonical 
Correlation 
1 7.669 87.6 87.6 .941 
2 1.021 11.7 99.3 .711 
3 .063 .7 100.0 .243 
 
 
A canonical correlation of .941, .711, and .243 for Function 1, 2 and 3 respectively, suggests the 
three functions explain 88.46%, 50.51%, and 5.90% of the variation (calculated as the square of the 
canonical correlation) in the grouping variable, i.e. the four borrower clusters with distinct attitudes 
towards RCC. 
 
Table 4.5: Borrower Discriminant Analysis: Wilks' Lambda 
Wilks' Lambda 
Test of 
Function(s) 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
Chi-
square df Sig. 
1 through 3 .054 793.880 69 .000 
2 through 3 .466 207.518 44 .000 
3 .941 16.521 21 .740 
 
 
Wilks’ lambda indicates the significance of the discriminant function. This table indicates a 
highly significant function (p < .000) and provides the proportion of total variability not explained, i.e. we 
have 5.4%, 46.6%, and 94.1% unexplained in Function 1, 2, and 3. 
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Table 4.6: Borrower Discriminant Analysis: Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function 
Coefficients 
Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients 
  Function 
1 2 3 
Sex of respondent .170 -.131 .312 
Age of respondent -.026 .278 .071 
Family size .008 .034 -.253 
Farm labor -.048 -.119 .360 
Worked outside -.054 -.114 .364 
Number of old people older than 65 .007 .204 .340 
Number of children younger than 12 .044 -.186 .273 
Education level of respondent .167 -.177 .155 
How many years have been farming .124 -.203 -.127 
Total land size hold (mu) .176 .103 -.441 
Income per mu from main plants .066 .084 -.379 
What was the total household income in the past 12 months 
from all sources including part time labor and remittances? 
.498 .307 .581 
Whether farming is the household's major operation? .215 .391 .062 
How much will you get (in RMB) if you sell all your assets 
(home, land, livestock, agriculture produce, etc.) 
.048 .238 -.207 
Are you a member of RCC -.054 .025 -.460 
Are you a member of a Group Guarantee? .291 .349 .220 
Loan from fomal institutions -.161 .232 .097 
Loan from friends and relatives -.047 .095 .337 
Land quality .804 -.188 .139 
Borrow relative .668 -.278 -.216 
Borrow friends .273 -.317 -.219 
Borrow RCC .291 -.192 -.266 
Borrow Bank .244 -.290 -.184 
 
 
The interpretation of the discriminant coefficients (or weights) is like that in multiple regressions. 
This table provides an index of the importance of each predictor like the standardized regression 
coefficients (Beta’s) did in multiple regression. The sign indicates the direction of the relationship. Across 
the three functions, land quality (scoring .804 in Function 1 and -.188 and .139 in Function 2 and 3 
respectively), source of credit including borrowing from relatives (scoring .668, -.278, and -.216 in 
Function 1, 2, and 3 respectively), friends (scoring .273, -.317, and -.219 in Function 1, 2, and 3 
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respectively), RCC (scoring .291, -.192, and -.266 in Function 1, 2, and 3 respectively), and Bank 
(scoring .244, -.290, and -.184 in Function 1, 2, and 3 respectively), total household income in the past 12 
months (scoring .498, .307, and .581 in Function 1, 2, and 3 respectively), whether farming is household's 
major operation (scoring .215, .391, and .062 in Function 1, 2, and 3 respectively), and group guarantee 
membership (scoring .291, .349, and .220 in Function 1, 2, and 3 respectively)were the strongest 
predictors while the rest were less important as predictors in determining variances within the dependent 
group variable. 
Table 4.7: Borrower Discriminant Analysis: Structure Matrix 
Structure Matrix 
  Function 
1 2 3 
Land quality .532 -.378 .004 
What was the total household income in the past 12 months 
from all sources including part time labor and remittances ? 
.304 .487 .243 
Borrow relative .261 -.333 .006 
Total land size hold (mu) .259 .359 -.237 
Whether farming is the household's major operation? .230 .542 -.164 
Are you a member of a Group Guarantee? .156 .536 .070 
Borrow friends .146 -.330 -.219 
Borrow RCC .110 .295 -.091 
Income per mu from the main plants .106 .423 -.237 
How many years have been farming .072 -.095 -.216 
Education level of respondent .069 .045 -.038 
Are you a member of RCC .062 .122 -.359 
Number of children younger than 12 .055 -.119 .185 
Borrow Bank .047 -.067 -.027 
Age of respondent -.044 .023 -.091 
How much will you get (in RMB) if you sell all your assets 
(home, land, livestock, agriculture produce, etc.) 
.035 .270 -.008 
Loan from friends and relatives .032 .042 .068 
Number of old people older than 65 .030 .017 .186 
Sex of respondent -.028 -.178 .411 
Loan from fomal institutions .015 .104 .009 
Farm labor -.014 .147 .227 
Worked outside -.013 .033 .324 
Family size -.001 .222 .255 
Pooled within-groups correlations between discriminating variables and standardized canonical 
discriminant functions. Variables ordered by absolute size of correlation within Function 1. 
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Structure Matrix correlations are another way of indicating the relative importance of the 
predictors. The results suggest that the same pattern holds as in the Standardized Canonical Discriminant 
Function Coefficients. The Structure Matrix table shows the correlations of each variable with each 
discriminant function. These Pearson coefficients are structure coefficients or discriminant loadings. They 
serve like factor loadings in factor analysis. Generally, just like factor loadings, 0.30 is seen as the cut-off 
between important and less important variables. 
The same pattern was observed in the Structure Matrix as in the Coefficient table above.  These 
variables were chosen from Function 1 through 3, given their relative contribution to the discrimination 
between cluster groups. We rank variables in the order of their respective absolute size of correlation 
within Function 1, which suggests that land quality (scoring .532 in Function 1 and -.378 and .004 in 
Function 2 and 3 respectively) and total household income in the past 12 months (scoring .304, .487, 
and .243 in Function 1, 2, and 3 respectively) are the strongest predictors, while family size (scoring -
.001, .222, and .255 in Function 1, 2, and 3 respectively) and family labor type that specifies farm labor 
(scoring -.014, .147, and .227 in Function 1, 2, and 3 respectively) or working outside (scoring -.013, .033, 
and .324 in Function 1, 2, and 3 respectively) are the poorest predictors. We provide detailed 
interpretations for the same variables in the following regression results. 
 
4.3.2 Regression results 
We report summary statistics for all independent variables used in the regressions in Table 4.8 
and Table 4.9. Among the 286 included observations, the average age of borrowers is 49, with the oldest 
respondent being 77 years old and the youngest being 20 years old. 53 percent of the respondents (151 
persons) are male, and 47 percent (135 persons) are female. The respondents have been farming for 23 
years on average, with the maximum and minimum being 60 years and no farming experience. 
Respondents will get 160,570 yuan (USD25,516) on average if they sell all the assets (home, land, 
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livestock, agriculture produce, etc.), with the maximum and minimum being 800,000 yuan (USD127,125) 
and 10 yuan (USD1.6). The 286 farm households on average have 3.3 mu17 (0.6 acre) of land, with the 
maximum and minimum being 30 mu (4.9 acre) and not owning any land. They hold on average 22,867 
yuan (USD3,634) of loan borrowed from formal financial institutions, with the maximum and minimum 
being 5,050,000 yuan (USD802,479) and not having any debt outstanding. They also hold on average 
2,206 yuan (USD351) of loan borrowed from friends and relatives, with the maximum and minimum 
being 200,000 yuan (USD31,781) and not owning any debt to friends and relatives. On average, 
respondents receive 4,100 yuan (USD652) per mu from main crop, with the maximum and minimum 
being 45,000 yuan (USD7,151) per mu and not receiving any income from main crop. The households 
receive 23,373 yuan (USD3,714) income in the past 12 months from all sources including part time labor 
and remittances, with the maximum and minimum being 80,000 yuan (USD12,713) and not having any 
income in the past 12 months.  
The 286 households have on average 4.2 persons in the family, with the maximum and minimum 
being 7 persons and 1 person. They have on average 2 farm labors in the family, with the maximum and 
minimum being 6 farm labors and not having any farm labor. In an average farm household there is 1 
non-farm labor working outside, with the maximum and minimum being 4 non-farm labors and none in a 
household. On average there is 0.4 person in one family that is older than 65 years old, and 0.8 person that 
is younger than 12 years old, with the maximum and minimum being 3 above-65-year-old family 
members and 4 below-12-year-old children, and none, respectively.  
In terms of education, 129 respondents (45.1 percent of the 286 respondents) completed high 
school, 41 respondents (14.3 percent) received some high school education, 35 respondents (12.2 percent) 
completed elementary school, 31 respondents (10.8 percent) received some elementary school education, 
23 respondents (8.0 percent) never went to school, 21 respondents (7.3 percent) received some university 
or college education, while 6 respondents (2.1 percent) completed university or college education. 
                                                          
17 Chinese measurement for a unit of area. 1 mu = 6.070284634 acres. 
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 For 121 households (42.3 percent of the 286 observations), farming is their major household 
operation, while it is not so for the remaining 165 households (57.7 percent). 23 households (8 percent) 
are members of the RCC while the other 263 households (92.0 percent) are not RCC members. 81 
households (28.3 percent) are members of group guarantee while the other 205 households (71.7 percent) 
do not belong to a guarantee group.  
In terms of the quality of their land, 135 respondents (47.2 percent) have moderate quality land, 
while 73 respondents (25.5 percent) have high quality land and 10 respondents (3.5 percent) have low 
quality land, and the remaining 68 households (23.8 percent) do not know the quality of their land. 
In terms of the sources of credit, 138 respondents (48.3 percent) have borrowed from relatives 
while the remaining 148 respondents (51.7 percent) have not; 77 respondents (26.9 percent) have 
borrowed from friends while the remaining 209 (73.1 percent) have not; 56 respondents (19.6 percent) 
have borrowed from the RCC while the remaining 230 (80.4 percent) have not; 13 respondents (4.5 
percent) have borrowed from a bank while the remaining 273 (95.5 percent) have not. 
We report results from both the GLM linear and multinomial logistic regressions in Table 4.10, 
where identical statistical inference can be drawn as in the previous discriminant analysis. We interpret 
the same set of predictors that were of statistical significance, in the order of their respective importance 
in predicting the cluster membership as observed in previous analyses. 
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Table 4.8: Summary Statistics for Borrower Categorical Variables 
Variable Description N Percent 
Gender 
Female 135 47.2% 
Male 151 52.8% 
Total 286 100.0% 
Education 
Completed university/college 6 2.1% 
Some university/college 21 7.3% 
Completed high school 129 45.1% 
Some high school 41 14.3% 
Completed elementary school 35 12.2% 
Some elementary school 31 10.8% 
Never went to school 23 8.0% 
Total 286 100.0% 
Farming major 
operation 
Whether farming is  the major 
household's operation or not? 
Yes 121 42.3% 
No 165 57.7% 
Total 286 100.0% 
Member RCC Are you a member of RCC? 
Yes 23 8.0% 
No 263 92.0% 
Total 286 100.0% 
Member 
Group 
Guarantee 
Are you a member of a Group 
Guarantee? 
Yes 81 28.3% 
No 205 71.7% 
Total 286 100.0% 
Quality of land 
Do not know 68 23.8% 
High 73 25.5% 
Moderate 135 47.2% 
Low 10 3.5% 
Total 286 100.0% 
Relatives_loan Have borrowed from relatives 
Yes 138 48.3% 
No 148 51.7% 
Total 286 100.0% 
Friends_loan Have borrowed from friends 
Yes 77 26.9% 
No 209 73.1% 
Total 286 100.0% 
RCC_loan Have borrowed from RCC 
Yes 56 19.6% 
No 230 80.4% 
Total 286 100.0% 
Bank_loan Have borrowed from Bank 
Yes 13 4.5% 
No 273 95.5% 
Total 286 100.0% 
Sample: 394; included observations: 286 
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Table 4.9: Summary Statistics for Borrower Continuous Variables 
Variable Description N Percent  Mean   Std. Dev.  Min  Max  
Age   286 100.0% 48.6 10.7 20.0 77.0 
Year farming How many years have been farming 286 100.0% 23.0 14.4 0.0 60.0 
Assets if sell 
(×1000) 
How much will you get 
(in RMB) if you sell all 
your assets (home, 
land, livestock, 
agriculture produce etc.) 
286 100.0% 160,570.0 152,968.2 10.0 800,000.0 
Total land size 
(mu)   286 100.0% 3.3 3.2 0.0 30.0 
Loan from FI  
(×1000) 
Loan from formal 
institutions 286 100.0% 22,867.1 298,645.5 0.0 5,050,000.0 
Loan from FR 
(×1000) 
Loan from friends and 
relatives 286 100.0% 2,206.3 14,457.3 0.0 200,000.0 
Income/mu of 
main crop 
(×1000) 
The income per mu of 
the main plants 286 100.0% 4,099.9 7,726.7 0.0 45,000.0 
Household 
income in past 
12m (×1000) 
What was the total 
household income in 
the past 12 months from 
all sources including 
part time labor and 
remittances ? 
286 100.0% 23,373.4 20,768.7 0.0 80,000.0 
Family size   286 100.0% 4.2 1.3 1.0 7.0 
Farm labor   286 100.0% 2.0 0.9 0.0 6.0 
Labor work 
outside   286 100.0% 0.9 0.9 0.0 4.0 
No. ppl older 
than 65 
Number of old people, 
age over 65 286 100.0% 0.4 0.7 0.0 3.0 
No. ppl younger 
than 12 
Number of children, age 
less than 12 286 100.0% 0.8 0.9 0.0 4.0 
Sample: 394; included observations:286 
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Table 4.10: Regression Results: Influence of Demographics on Four Borrower Clusters 
Parameter 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 
Moderately agree Moderately agree Disagree Strongly agree 
Linear Logistic Linear Logistic Linear Logistic Linear Logistic 
B p-value B p-value B p-value B p-value B p-value B p-value B p-value B p-value 
Age -0.000235 .830 -0.526055 .000 -0.003065 .301 -0.033889 .149 -0.001768 .475 -0.014851 .548 0.005068 .026 0.076526 .011 
Gender -0.040755 .052 1.152238 .294 -0.007650 .885 -0.041611 .916 0.079186 .113 0.677295 .130 -0.030781 .470 -0.642236 .229 
Year farming -0.001088 .266 1.774440 .000 0.002392 .144 0.036329 .046 0.001140 .514 0.016184 .462 -0.002445 .110 -0.031895 .086 
Assets if sell (×1000) -0.000040 .480 -0.000125 .000 -0.000093 .584 -0.000001 .650 -0.000232 .096 -0.000003 .068 0.000365 .021 0.000006 .002 
Total land size (mu) -0.007723 .087 -6.713524 .000 0.012601 .356 0.065108 .437 -0.016708 .182 -0.105966 .248 0.011829 .316 0.058346 .620 
Loan from FI  (×1000) 0.000073 .000 0.000051 .000 -0.000150 .000 -0.000001 .002 -0.000065 .033 -0.000023 .320 0.000142 .000 0.000001 .000 
Loan from FR (×1000) 0.000004 .994 0.000608 .000 -0.002621 .181 -0.000012 .324 0.001446 .468 0.000009 .489 0.001171 .540 0.000016 .360 
Inc./mu of main crop (×1000) -0.001872 .292 0.001065 .000 0.004609 .239 0.000040 .185 -0.005047 .067 -0.000209 .050 0.002310 .535 0.000017 .702 
Hh inc. in past 12m (×1000) -0.004462 .000 -0.000179 .000 -0.004209 .033 -0.000021 .127 0.002309 .191 0.000032 .061 0.006362 .000 0.000054 .003 
Family size -0.004105 .628 -4.053776 .000 0.022789 .401 0.093134 .593 -0.019527 .490 -0.147844 .530 0.000842 .968 0.357275 .352 
Farm labor 0.008518 .374 10.515320 .000 -0.023183 .486 -0.053918 .798 0.039159 .264 0.271953 .348 -0.024494 .328 -0.692124 .096 
Labor work outside 0.013256 .232 10.536775 .000 -0.030977 .376 -0.211312 .421 0.042216 .175 0.306746 .268 -0.024495 .378 -0.428753 .281 
No. ppl older than 65 -0.002211 .859 18.084608 .000 -0.070619 .061 -0.439015 .079 0.011452 .765 0.044336 .874 0.061378 .040 0.531355 .165 
No. ppl younger than 12 -0.008345 .372 -8.558979 .000 0.001356 .962 0.037133 .815 0.047045 .130 0.382741 .072 -0.040055 .044 -0.468361 .248 
Edu_completed univ/college -0.369373 .000 -50.585076 .000 0.535859 .030 3.623945 .036 0.178955 .334 2.029513 .113 -0.345441 .002 -22.701412 .000 
Edu_some univ/college -0.097746 .033 -71.538665 .000 0.027760 .831 0.711868 .534 0.188592 .099 1.713199 .074 -0.118606 .309 -0.947413 .460 
Edu_completed highschool -0.033033 .293 -55.329646 .000 0.065894 .463 0.851320 .353 0.062745 .402 0.749739 .358 -0.095606 .210 -1.066331 .205 
Edu_some highschool -0.074258 .059 -39.641914 .000 0.078399 .441 0.900637 .358 0.089475 .356 0.693480 .480 -0.093617 .296 -0.743834 .401 
Edu_completed elementary -0.053814 .058 -54.081341 .000 0.158998 .135 1.343923 .146 -0.012347 .891 -0.010160 .991 -0.092837 .252 -1.146560 .180 
Edu_some elementary -0.039443 .202 -59.267552 .000 0.088881 .371 0.932244 .362 0.049943 .596 0.311222 .766 -0.099381 .205 -0.786087 .501 
Edu_never school 0.000000 . 0.000000 . 0.000000 . 0.000000 . 0.000000 . 0.000000 . 0.000000 . 0.000000 . 
Farming major operation -0.099338 .001 -51.561702 .000 -0.090097 .248 -0.415748 .382 -0.044615 .571 0.081066 .861 0.234050 .000 2.311141 .000 
Member RCC 0.016107 .564 -8.106643 .037 0.148613 .169 0.733207 .288 -0.153552 .051 -1.656155 .067 -0.011169 .909 0.087858 .935 
Member Group Guarantee -0.116884 .000 32.534802 .000 -0.102144 .243 -0.492113 .403 -0.015652 .815 0.386016 .528 0.234679 .001 1.637748 .011 
Quality of land -0.220801 .000 -30.383973 .000 0.093796 .012 0.781810 .002 0.119921 .001 1.130729 .001 0.007083 .853 0.361828 .316 
Relatives_loan -0.255791 .000 -80.843948 .000 0.244192 .000 1.630152 .001 0.093395 .134 1.069920 .021 -0.081796 .189 -0.532137 .363 
Friends_loan -0.096819 .000 -35.807602 .000 0.184728 .012 0.899276 .045 0.056778 .404 0.178451 .676 -0.144686 .004 -2.426026 .000 
RCC_loan -0.132815 .002 -45.809835 .000 0.204592 .003 1.253004 .014 0.020279 .786 0.355386 .570 -0.092056 .165 -1.035497 .097 
Bank_loan -0.167597 .026 -67.577979 .000 0.342580 .019 2.051901 .025 0.080185 .555 0.460930 .579 -0.255168 .015 -1.278399 .264 
Obs. Total 394, excluded 108, effective 286. Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square = 644.8 and 322.8 for linear and logit regressions with Cluster 1; 105.9 and 100.5 with Cluster 2, 77.4 and 84.9 with Cluster 3, 230.0 and 192.3 with Cluster 4, all significant at the .05 level. 
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Quality of land: Better land quality, less favor RCC. Across Cluster 1, 2 (moderately agree) and 
Cluster 3 (disagree), the likelihood of borrower being in the cluster increased from a negative 22.0801 
percentage to a positive 9.3796 percentage, to a positive 11.9921 percentage. 
Major source of farm household credit18:  
• Loan from relatives: Similar impacts of loans from relatives and friends on attitudes towards RCC, 
given same signs for both dummies across all clusters, except for Cluster 4 which is statistically not 
significant. In Cluster 1, 2 (moderately agree) and Cluster 3 (disagree), the likelihood of borrower 
being in the cluster returns a negative 25.5791 percentage, a positive 24.4192 percentage, and a 
positive 9.3395 percentage respectively. 
• Loan from friends: Better access to loans from friends, less favor towards RCC. In Cluster 1, 2 
(moderately agree) and Cluster 4 (strongly agree), the likelihood of borrower being in the cluster 
returns a negative 9.6819 percentage, a positive 18.4728 percentage, and a negative 14.4686 
percentage respectively. 
• Loan from RCC: Similar impacts of loans from RCC and banks on attitudes towards RCC, given 
same signs for both dummies across all clusters. In Cluster 1 and 2 (moderately agree), the likelihood 
of borrower being in the cluster returns a negative 13.2815 percentage, and a positive 20.4592 
percentage respectively. 
• Loan from Bank: More access to bank loans, less favor RCC. In Cluster 1, 2 (moderately agree) and 
Cluster 4 (strongly agree), the likelihood of borrower being in the cluster returns a negative 16.7597 
percentage, a positive 34.2580 percentage, and a negative 25.5168 percentage respectively. 
Loan from Formal Institutions19 (×1000): Stronger agreement attitude towards RCC is positively 
associated with loan amount from formal institutions. Across Cluster 3 (disagree) to Cluster 4 (strongly 
                                                          
18 We include in the regression model both dummy variables that specify five distinct sources of farm household 
credit, i.e., loan from relatives, friends, RCC, Bank, and money lender/other sources/no debt, as well as three 
continuous predictors that specify the loan amount from Formal Institutions, the loan amount from Friends and 
Relatives, and the loan amount from Informal Sources. 
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agree), the likelihood of borrower being in the cluster increased from a negative 0.0065 percentage to a 
positive 0.0142 percentage. 
Household income in past 12 months (×1000): Stronger agreement attitude towards RCC is 
positively associated with household income from all sources in the past 12 months. An 1000 yuan 
incremental increase in income is associated with a 0.6362 percentage increase in the likelihood of 
borrower being in Cluster 4 (strongly agree), a 0.4462 percentage decrease and a 0.4209 percentage 
decrease in the likelihood of borrower being in Cluster 1 and 2 respectively (both moderately agree), and 
a 0.2309 percentage increase in the likelihood of borrower being in Cluster 3 (strongly agree). 
Whether farming is household’s major operation: Households with farming being major 
operation tend to favor RCC. Across Cluster 1 (moderately agree) to Cluster 4 (strongly agree), the 
likelihood of borrower being in the cluster increased from a negative 9.9338 percentage to a positive 
23.4050 percentage. 
Member of Group Guarantee: Being a group guarantee member is associated with positive 
attitudes towards RCC. Across Cluster 1 (moderately agree) to Cluster 4 (strongly agree), the likelihood 
of borrower being in the cluster increased from a negative 11.6884 percentage to a positive 23.4679 
percentage. 
Total amount obtained if sell all household assets (home, land, livestock, agriculture produce, 
etc.) (×1000): Assets amount has strong positive correlation with favor towards RCC; an 1000 yuan 
incremental increase in total assets sold is associated with a 0.0232 percentage decrease in the likelihood 
of borrower being in cluster 3 (disagree), a 0.0040 percentage decrease in the likelihood of borrower 
being in cluster 1 (moderately agree), and a 0.0365 percentage increase in the likelihood of borrower 
being in cluster 3 (strongly agree). 
Level of education: For Cluster 1 and 4 that favor RCCs, the negative coefficient signs across all 
the seven different levels of education indicate that higher educated borrowers have less favor towards 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
19 We specify in the survey that Formal Institutions include RCC, ABC, Postal Savings bank, and commercial banks 
excluding the previous three types of financial institutions; Informal Sources include Community Mutual Fund/Loan, 
NGO, Money lenders, Pawn shop, Credit Only Loan Company (non-deposit) Institution, and other loan sources. 
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RCC, likely due to their limited demand for RCC credit. The absolute value of coefficients in Cluster 1 
increased progressively as the education level advances. As shown in Table 4.10, for borrowers in Cluster 
1 (moderately agree), the likelihood of them being in this cluster declined sharply from a 5.3814 
percentage decrease for "completed elementary", to a 7.4258 percentage decrease for "some high school" 
and a 9.7746 percentage decrease for "some university/college", which was followed by a 36.9373 
percentage drop for "completed university/college". This was consistent with the trend in Cluster 4 
(strongly agree), where a borrower who completed university/college degree is associated with a 34.5441 
percentage decrease in the likelihood of him/her being in this group. 
 
4.4 Shandong lenders 
Similarly, I conduct discriminant analysis and regressions to assess how demographics influence 
the two cluster membership of the loan officers.  We specified on the survey to lenders that all the 
questions target credit extension to farm households, in order to match with the survey to farm household 
borrowers.   
 
Figure 4.17: Above 40 Percent Loans Made in the Past 12 Months were to Farm Households for 
Crops/Livestock Use 
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4.4.1 Discriminant analysis: summary of canonical discriminant functions 
Table 4.11: Lender Discriminant Analysis: Eigenvalues 
Eigenvalues 
Function Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative % 
Canonical 
Correlation 
1 .229a 100.0 100.0 .432 
a. First 1 canonical discriminant functions were used in the analysis. 
 
A canonical correlation of .432 for the Function suggests the Function explain 18.66% (square of 
the canonical correlation) of the variation in the grouping variable, i.e. whether the lender belongs to 
Cluster 1 or 2. 
 
Table 4.12: Lender Discriminant Analysis: Wilks' Lambda 
Wilks' Lambda 
Test of Function(s) Wilks' Lambda Chi-square df Sig. 
1 .813 19.204 16 .258 
 
 
Wilks’ lambda indicates an insignificant discriminant function (p >.05) and provides the 
proportion of total variability not explained, i.e. we have 81.3% unexplained in the Function.  
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Table 4.13: Lender Discriminant Analysis: Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function 
Coefficients 
Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients 
  Function 
1 
Approximated percentage loans made in past 12 months to: Farm 
households for crops/livestock 
.763 
Approximated percentage loans made in past 12 months to: Individual 
businesses 
.506 
County .311 
Age .311 
Approximated percentage loans made in past 12 months to: Farm 
households for forestry 
.266 
Percentage loans acquainted loan officers rejected among all received 
applications 
-.266 
Your monthly after-tax income (including bonus, subsidy, etc) .259 
Percentage loans you rejected among all received applications .257 
Percentage loans your RCC rejected among all received applications -.176 
Your highest education level .169 
Approximated percentage loans made in past 12 months to: Non-farm 
individuals (professional like lawyers, doctors, etc.) 
.163 
Years of formal training in agriculture related area .111 
Years working as a loan officer -.092 
Gender -.084 
Percentage loan amount actually lent to borrower/total amount requested in 
latest quarter 
.083 
Average loan amount held by typical client borrowed from friends, relatives, 
or other informal sources 
.023 
Variables re-ordered by absolute size of coefficient value. 
 
  
Despite the weak explanatory power indicated by the Canonical Correlation value and Wilks' 
Lambda, we provide interpretation of the discriminant coefficients for consistency. Among 16 predictors, 
percentage of loans made in past 12 months to farm households for crops/livestock (scoring .763) and to 
individual businesses (scoring .506) as well as to farm households for forestry (scoring .266), county, age, 
percentage of loans acquainted loan officers rejected among all received applications (scoring -.266), and 
monthly after-tax income (including bonus, subsidy, etc.) are the most important predictors in that order. 
The remaining predictors were less important determining variances within the lender cluster membership.  
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Table 4.14: Lender Discriminant Analysis: Structure Matrix 
Structure Matrix 
 
Function 
1 
County .521 
Approximated percentage loans made in past 12 months to: Farm households for 
crops/livestock 
.503 
Years working as a loan officer .376 
Percentage loans acquainted loan officers rejected among all received applications -.354 
Your monthly after-tax income (including bonus, subsidy, etc) .322 
Percentage loan amount actually lent to borrower/total amount requested in latest quarter .321 
Years of formal training in agriculture related area .311 
Gender -.284 
Approximated percentage loans made in past 12 months to: Individual businesses .272 
Age .234 
Percentage loans your RCC rejected among all received applications -.233 
Approximated percentage loans made in past 12 months to: Urban householdsa .227 
Approximated percentage loans made in past 12 months to: Farm households for forestry .227 
Percentage loans you rejected among all received applications -.175 
Approximated percentage loans made in past 12 months to: Non-farm individuals 
(professional like lawyers, doctors, etc.) 
-.136 
Your highest education level -.112 
Average loan amount held by typical client borrowed from friends, relatives, or other 
informal sources 
.007 
Pooled within-groups correlations between discriminating variables and standardized canonical 
discriminant functions. Variables ordered by absolute size of correlation within function. 
 a. This variable not used in the analysis. 
 
The same pattern of predictor importance was observed in the Structure Matrix, as in the 
Coefficient table above. We again rank variables in the order of their respective absolute value of 
correlation within Function 1. Given the .30 threshold for the importance measurement, we observe that 
county (scoring .521), percentage of loans made in past 12 months to farm households for crops/livestock 
(scoring .503), years working as a loan officer (scoring .376), percentage loans acquainted loan officers 
rejected among all received applications (scoring -.354), monthly after-tax income (including bonus, 
subsidy, etc., scoring .322), percentage of loan amount actually lent to borrower out of total amount 
requested in last quarter (scoring .321), as well as years of formal training in agriculture related area 
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(scoring .311) were the strongest predictors, while average loan amount held by typical client borrowed 
from friends, relatives, or other informal sources (scoring .007) was the poorest predictor. We provide 
detailed interpretations for these variables in the following regression results. 
 
4.4.2 Regression results 
Again we run GLM (General Linearized Model) regressions and report summary statistics for all 
independent variables in Table 4.15 and Table 4.16. Among the 103 observations, we have 35, 35, and 33 
loan officers from Shan Xian, Cao Xian, and Cheng Wu counties, respectively. 38 of the 103 observations 
(36.9 percent) are female and 65 (63.1 percent) are male. The average age among the 103 lenders is 34, 
with the maximum and minimum being 48 and 21. They have been working as a loan officer for an 
average of 4.6 years, with the maximum and minimum being 25 years and zero (those who just started the 
job as a loan officer). They have received an average of 2.8 years’ agriculture related formal training, with 
the maximum and minimum being 25 years and no training at all. 
In terms of education, 67 lenders (65.0 percent out of the 103 observations) have an associate 
degree, 24 lenders (23.3 percent) have a University bachelor degree, 9 lenders (8.7 percent) have a high 
school degree, 2 lenders (1.9 percent) received graduate school degrees, and 1 lender (1.0 percent) 
received a middle school degree. 
We obtain lenders’ compensation measured by their monthly after-tax income. 49 lenders (47.6 
percent) receive after-tax income of RMB3,000 – 5,000 (USD477 – 795) per month, 47 lenders (45.6 
percent) receive after-tax income less than RMB3,000 (USD477) per month, 6 lenders (5.8 percent) 
receive after-tax income of RMB5,000 – 7,000 (USD795 - 1,112) per month, and 1 lender (1.0 percent) 
receives after-tax income higher than RMB9,000 (USD1,430). 
In terms of their lending performance, on average, the average loan amount held by their typical 
client borrowed from friends, relatives, or other informal sources is 139,806 yuan (USD22,216), with the 
maximum and minimum being 3,400,000 yuan (USD540,283) and not having any debt outstanding to 
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friends, relatives, or other informal sources. Among all received applications, on average the 103 lenders 
rejected 0.1 percent of the loans, with the maximum and minimum being 0.8 percent and zero; on average 
their RCC rejected the same 0.1 percent, with the maximum and minimum being 0.9 percent and zero; on 
average their acquainted loan officers also rejected 0.1 percent of the filed loan applications, with the 
maximum and minimum being 0.9 percent and zero. 
On average, the 103 lenders actually lent out 50 percent of the requested loan amount to the 
borrower in the latest quarter, with the maximum and minimum being 100 percent and zero. In terms of 
the use of loans, an approximate 39 percent of loans made in the past 12 months were to farm households 
for crops and livestock use, 10 percent to far households for forestry use, 10 percent to urban households, 
8 percent to non-farm individuals (professionals like lawyers, doctors, etc.), and 19 percent to individual 
businesses. 
We report results for both Linear and Multinomial Logistic regressions in Table 4.17, in the same 
way as we conducted the analyses for the borrowers’ four cluster membership. The difference in the 
lender membership analysis from the borrower analysis turns out to be, the two lenders clusters are each 
the baseline to the other when we include each as a dummy variable in regression equations. This explains 
the exact same significance level for very predictor in both clusters, and the exact same absolute value of 
each coefficient, though obviously opposite signs.  
We interpret an identical set of predictors that were of statistical significance, in the order of their 
respective importance in predicting the cluster membership as observed in the determinant analyses. 
Credit allocation:  
• Approximated percentage loans made in past 12 months to Farm households for crops/livestock use: 
Higher percentage of loans to farm households for crops/livestock use is associated with stronger 
attitudes of the lender agreeing that RCC serves the credit demand of borrowers well and is favored 
by clients. One unit increase in the percentage of this kind of loans is associated with a 57.7702 
percentage increase in the likelihood of lender being in Cluster 2 (strongly agree) instead of being in 
Cluster 1 (moderately agree). 
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• Approximated percentage loans made in past 12 months to Individual businesses: Similarly, higher 
percentage of loans to individual businesses is associated with stronger attitudes of the lender 
agreeing that RCC serves the credit demand of borrowers well and is favored by clients. One unit 
increase in the percentage of this kind of loans is associated with a 68.7392 percentage increase in the 
likelihood of lender being in Cluster 2 (strongly agree) instead of being in Cluster 1 (moderately 
agree). 
Monthly after-tax income (including bonus, subsidy, etc.): Higher income for the lender seems to 
be associated with more caution towards RCC performance. We observe that between a lower income 
(and hence likely to be junior) loan officer whose monthly after-tax income is within the RMB3,000-
5,000 range, and a higher income (and hence likely to be senior) loan officer whose monthly after-tax 
income is higher than RMB9,000, the difference in cluster membership is a 17.5302 percentage increase 
in the likelihood of lender being in Cluster 2 (strongly agree) instead of being in Cluster 1 (moderately 
agree), versus a 33.4232 percentage increase in the likelihood of lender being in Cluster 1 rather than 
Cluster 2. 
Level of education: The coefficient signs for all the five levels of educations are positive for 
Cluster 1 (moderately agree), while the absolute coefficient value increases as the education level 
advances. Across loan officers with highest education being high school, associate degree, University 
bachelor degree, and graduate school, the associated likelihoods of them being in Cluster 2 (strongly 
agree) rather than in Cluster 1 gets higher, ranging from a percentage increase of 63.5348, 52.6873, 
56.7034, and 85.8180, respectively. 
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Table 4.15: Summary Statistics for Lender Categorical Variables 
 
Variable Description N Percent 
County 
Shan Xian 35 34.0% 
Cao Xian 35 34.0% 
Cheng Wu 33 32.0% 
Total 103 100.0% 
Gender 
Female 38 36.9% 
Male 65 63.1% 
Total 103 100.0% 
Education 
Graduate school 2 1.9% 
University bachelor 
degree 24 23.3% 
Associate degree 67 65.0% 
High school 9 8.7% 
Middle school 1 1.0% 
Total 103 100.0% 
Monthly after-tax 
income 
Higher than RMB9,000 1 1.0% 
RMB5,000 - 7,000 6 5.8% 
RMB3,000 - 5,000 49 47.6% 
Less than RMB3,000 47 45.6% 
Total 103 100.0% 
Sample: 120; included observations: 103. 
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Table 4.16: Summary Statistics for Lender Continuous Variables 
 
Variable N Percent  Mean   Std. Dev.  Min  Max  
Age 103 100.0% 34.0 7.4 21.0 48.0 
Years of formal training in agriculture 
related area 103 100.0% 2.8 5.0 0.0 25.0 
Years working as a loan officer 103 100.0% 4.6 5.5 0.0 25.0 
Average loan amount held by typical 
client borrowed from friends, 
relatives, or other informal sources  
(×1000) 
103 100.0% 139,805.8 446,382.5 0.0 3,400,000.0 
Percentage loans YOU rejected 
among all received applications 103 100.0% 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.8 
Percentage loans YOUR RCC 
rejected among all received 
applications 
103 100.0% 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.9 
Percentage loans ACQUAINTED 
LOAN OFFICERS rejected among all 
received applications 
103 100.0% 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.9 
Percentage loan amount actually lent 
to borrower/total amount requested in 
latest quarter 
103 100.0% 0.5 0.3 0.0 1.0 
Approximated percentage loans 
made in past 12 months to: Farm 
households for crops/livestock 
103 100.0% 0.4 0.3 0.0 1.0 
Approximated percentage loans 
made in past 12 months to: Farm 
households for forestry 
103 100.0% 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.0 
Approximated percentage loans 
made in past 12 months to: Urban 
households 
103 100.0% 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.0 
Approximated percentage loans 
made in past 12 months to: Non-farm 
individuals (professional like lawyers, 
doctors, etc.) 
103 100.0% 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.0 
Approximated percentage loans 
made in past 12 months to: Individual 
businesses 
103 100.0% 0.2 0.2 0.0 1.0 
Sample: 120; included observations: 103. 
 
  
 71 
 
Table 4.17: Regression Results: Influence of Demographics on Two Lender Clusters 
 
Parameter 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
Moderately agree Strongly agree 
Linear Logistic Linear Logistic 
B 
p-
value B 
p-
value B 
p-
value B 
p-
value 
County: Shan Xian -0.143731 .317 -0.694348 .339 0.143731 .317 0.694348 .339 
County: Cao Xian 0.049260 .723 0.231465 .751 -0.049260 .723 -0.231465 .751 
County: Cheng Wu 0.000000 . 0.000000 . 0.000000 . 0.000000 . 
Gender: Female 0.067244 .564 0.380230 .508 -0.067244 .564 -0.380230 .508 
Gender: Male 0.000000 . 0.000000 . 0.000000 . 0.000000 . 
Education: Graduate school -0.858180 .004 -24.549604 . 0.858180 .004 24.549631 . 
Education: University bachelor degree -0.567034 .000 -22.845761 . 0.567034 .000 22.845788 . 
Education: Associate degree -0.526873 .000 -22.644738 . 0.526873 .000 22.644765 . 
Education: High school -0.635348 .003 -23.255667 . 0.635348 .003 23.255694 . 
Education: Middle school 0.000000 . 0.000000 . 0.000000 . 0.000000 . 
Monthly after-tax income: Higher than RMB9,000 0.334232 .052 21.884223 .000 -0.334232 .052 -21.884223 .000 
Monthly after-tax income: RMB5,000 - 7,000 -0.150111 .497 -0.817929 .500 0.150111 .497 0.817929 .500 
Monthly after-tax income: RMB3,000 - 5,000 -0.175302 .091 -0.892436 .083 0.175302 .091 0.892436 .083 
Monthly after-tax income: Less than RMB3,000 0.000000 . 0.000000 . 0.000000 . 0.000000 . 
Age -0.001874 .845 -0.004739 .925 0.001874 .845 0.004739 .925 
Years of formal training in agriculture related area -0.001933 .860 -0.007046 .910 0.001933 .860 0.007046 .910 
Years working as a loan officer 0.004667 .694 0.024159 .692 -0.004667 .694 -0.024159 .692 
Average loan amount held by typical client 
borrowed from friends, relatives, or other informal 
sources  (×1000) 
-0.000030 .790 -0.000143 . 0.000030 .790 0.000143 . 
Percentage loans YOU rejected among all received 
applications -0.343306 .346 -1.828894 .331 0.343306 .346 1.828894 .331 
Percentage loans YOUR RCC rejected among all 
received applications 0.095415 .812 0.785526 .711 -0.095415 .812 -0.785526 .711 
Percentage loans ACQUAINTED LOAN OFFICERS 
rejected among all received applications 0.346647 .412 1.340847 .565 -0.346647 .412 -1.340847 .565 
Percentage loan amount actually lent to 
borrower/total amount requested in latest quarter -0.017890 .898 -0.127281 .867 0.017890 .898 0.127281 .867 
Approximated percentage loans made in past 12 
months to: Farm households for crops/livestock -0.577702 .001 -3.457237 .002 0.577702 .001 3.457237 .002 
Approximated percentage loans made in past 12 
months to: Farm households for forestry 0.095681 .754 0.146946 .959 -0.095681 .754 -0.146946 .959 
Approximated percentage loans made in past 12 
months to: Urban households -0.063789 .754 -1.452520 .558 0.063789 .754 1.452520 .558 
Approximated percentage loans made in past 12 
months to: Non-farm individuals (professional like 
lawyers, doctors, etc.) 
-0.263041 .526 -1.710591 .474 0.263041 .526 1.710591 .474 
Approximated percentage loans made in past 12 
months to: Individual businesses -0.687392 .086 -4.235054 .077 0.687392 .086 4.235054 .077 
Obs. Total 120, excluded 17, effective 103. Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square = 28.8 and 29.7 for linear and logit regressions, respectively. 
Significant at the .05 level only for Cluster 2. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In this thesis I analyzed the disconnects between lenders’ and borrowers’ perceptions on various 
sets of identical questions regarding RCC lending practices.  The specific objectives investigated were: 
RCCs’ care towards farm household borrowers and their demand for agricultural credit, reasons that farm 
households loan applications are rejected by an RCC, the role of group guarantee membership in RCC 
lending, loan officers’ concerns during loan reviews, cost of borrowing for RCC credit, reasons for 
borrower default, credit rationing, and loan officers’ preferences towards borrowers.  Key findings 
include that there are mismatches between lenders’ and borrowers’ understandings regarding the role of 
“trust” and “care” towards borrowers, guarantee mechanisms, and the timing of repayments.  
Generally, I discover that there is a fundamental disconnect between how farmers perceive 
lenders and how lenders perceive farmers and agriculture. Much of this appears to be a matter of 
communication between the lender and the borrower, as well as a borrower and lender education issue. I 
therefore recommend that RCCs embark on policy initiatives to close this gap in order to better align 
expectations of lenders and borrowers.  The recommendations are outlined as follows. 
Referring to Figure 1.3, the triangle relationship between the RCC as a financial institution, the 
loan officer as the employee, and the farm household as the customer, I have identified specific strategies 
for each of the branches, representing relationship between the institution and its employee, the institution 
and its customer, as well as the direct relationship between the employee and the customers. 
Recommendation 1: RCC – customer relationship: RCCs should work on marketing and 
delivering to farm households the idea that they care about agriculture and the well-being of farm 
households. 
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Recommendation 2: RCC – customer relationship: RCCs should invest resources in educating 
rural households about best credit practices.  These marketing efforts should also emphasize credit 
education to borrowers regarding understanding loan contracts and terms. 
Recommendation 3: RCC – employee relationship: RCCs should have a devoted team of loan 
officers who specialize in farm household loans vis-à-vis broader agriculture related loans, which is the 
current categorization on RCC loan books regarding agricultural credit but in fact a large part of which 
comprises of loans to small-and-medium sized enterprises engaging in agriculture related businesses. 
Compared with the usual rural team, this farm team should have different incentives, in terms of both 
compensation and performance measurement, to reward their specialization in farm retail loans. 
Recommendation 4: Employee – customer relationship: RCCs should invest in marketing efforts 
to ease the tensions between loan officers and farm households regarding their different understanding 
towards the role of group guarantees, procedure and cost of borrowing in approving a loan, as well as in 
loan servicing. 
Recommendation 5: Employee – RCC relationship: RCCs should provide regular training to loan 
officers to ensure enforcement of lending practices and standardization of loan servicing. 
For future research, I propose that borrower data that exactly matches up with the lenders be 
collected for analyses.  In this study I used borrower data from a prior survey conducted in 2009 to farm 
households in the same province, but not likely matched up to the identical three counties.  Particularly, I 
have in total 14 valid borrower data points to pair with the 120 lenders for the question on reasons that 
borrowers being rejected a loan, since on the 2009 survey, that was followed by a previous question 
asking if the borrower has borrowed from local RCCs and if yes (15 farmers), what the reasons are for 
being rejected a loan.  To ensure representativeness, I compare results from this Shandong borrower 
survey with an identical survey to 897 farm household in Shannxi province conducted in 2009, and found 
borrowers’ attitudes were consistent.  It would be intriguing to obtain sufficient data from farm 
households who are the usual customers of our surveyed RCCs. 
74 
 
Future research should also investigate specific issues that we observed in this study, such as the 
role of group guarantee membership in RCC lending.  My conjecture from paring perceptions of the 
borrower and the lender is that the borrower tends to overemphasize the importance of being a group 
guarantee member in loan approval, while the lender takes group guarantee requirement less seriously.  
Studying this particular issue in the rural lending regime will help examine the unintended policy 
rationing effect that lead to insufficient credit supply in rural China. 
 This study opens the doors for future research to employ quantitative methods to study RCCs and 
the RCC system.  These include credit subsidies to rural financial institutions and target credit extension 
to farm households in forms of government subsidies on interest rates, and taxes to the institutions. 
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APPENDIX 
1. Non-parametric test: Mann-Whitney U test (independent 2 samples) 
The Mann–Whitney U test (also called the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon (MWW) or Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test) is a non-parametric statistical hypothesis test for assessing whether one of two samples of 
independent observations tends to have larger values than the other. 
Compared to Student’s t-test, the U test is usually suitable for small sample sizes (less than 15 
samples).  The major differences between the two tests are: 
Ordinal data: U remains the logical choice when the data are ordinal but not interval scaled, so 
that the spacing between adjacent values cannot be assumed to be constant. 
Robustness: As it compares the sums of ranks, the Mann–Whitney test is less likely than the t-test 
to spuriously indicate significance because of the presence of outliers – i.e. Mann–Whitney is more robust. 
Efficiency: When normality holds, MWW has an (asymptotic) efficiency of  or about 0.95 
when compared to the t test. For distributions sufficiently far from normal and for sufficiently large 
sample sizes, the MWW can be considerably more efficient than the t. 
 
2. Results from parametric and non-parametric tests 
2.1 Results of T-tests 
<Table AI Group Statistics for t-Test> 
<Table AII Independent Samples Test for t-Test> 
2.2 Results of non-parametric U tests 
<Table AIII Hypothesis Test Summary for U-Test> 
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Table 4.18: Borrower Descriptive Statistics 
 
Descriptive Statistics for All Borrowers 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Age of respondent 394 20 77.00 48.25 10.97 
Sex of respondent 394 0 1.00 0.50 0.50 
How many years have been farming 387 .00 60.00 23.52 14.37 
How much will you get (in RMB) if 
you sell all your assets (home, land, 
livestock, agriculture produce, etc.) 
385 10.00 900,000.00 151,818.21 153,248.49 
Total land size hold (mu) 390 .00 30.00 3.18 3.07 
Loan from formal institutions 394 .00 5,050,000.00 17,050.76 254,538.50 
Loan from friends and relatives 394 .00 200,000.00 1,708.12 12,391.76 
Income per mu from main plants 333 .00 130,000.00 4,436.76 10,571.50 
What was the total household 
income in the past 12 months from 
all sources including part time labor 
and remittances ? 
388 0 150,000.00 24,881.15 22,190.73 
Family size 391 1 9.00 4.03 1.44 
Farm labor 393 0 6.00 1.80 1.02 
Worked outside 391 0 4.00 0.92 0.89 
Number of old people older than 65 390 0 3.00 0.44 0.69 
Number of children younger than 12 391 0 4.00 0.92 1.01 
Education level of respondent 392 0 6.00 3.09 1.50 
Whether farming is the household's 
major operation? 388 0 1.00 0.38 0.49 
Are you a member of RCC? 390 0 1.00 0.08 0.28 
Are you a member of a Group 
Guarantee? 378 0 1.00 0.23 0.42 
Land quality 387 .00 3.00 1.41 0.85 
Borrow relative 394 .00 1.00 0.56 0.50 
Borrow friends 394 .00 1.00 0.37 0.48 
Borrow RCC 394 .00 1.00 0.17 0.38 
Borrow Bank 394 .00 1.00 0.04 0.19 
Borrow Money Lender or none or 
others 394 .00 1.00 0.24 0.43 
Valid N (listwise) 300     
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Table 4.19: Lender Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics for All Lenders 
  
N Minimum  Maximum   Mean  
 Std. 
Deviation  
County 120 1 3.00 2.00 0.82 
Gender 120 1 2.00 1.37 0.48 
Your highest education level 120 1 5.00 3.13 0.66 
Your monthly after-tax income 
(including bonus, subsidy, etc) 120 1 5.00 1.67 0.70 
Age 120 21 48.00 34.44 7.46 
Years of formal training in agriculture 
related area 120 0 25.00 2.57 4.77 
Years working as a loan officer 119 0 30.00 4.81 6.07 
Average loan amount held by typical 
client borrowed from friends, 
relatives, or other informal sources 
116 0 3,400,000.00 130,534.48 421,695.35 
Percentage loans you rejected 
among all received applications 118 0 0.80 0.14 0.16 
Percentage loans your RCC rejected 
among all received applications 118 0 0.90 0.14 0.16 
Percentage loans acquainted loan 
officers rejected among all received 
applications 
118 0 0.90 0.15 0.17 
Percentage loan amount actually 
lent to borrower/total amount 
requested in latest quarter 
114 0 0.99 0.51 0.35 
Approximated percentage loans 
made in past 12 months to: Farm 
households for crops/livestock 
118 0 0.99 0.39 0.29 
Approximated percentage loans 
made in past 12 months to: Farm 
households for forestry 
119 0 0.70 0.10 0.12 
Approximated percentage loans 
made in past 12 months to: Urban 
households 
120 0 0.60 0.10 0.11 
Approximated percentage loans 
made in past 12 months to: Non-
farm individuals (professional like 
lawyers, doctors, etc.) 
120 0 0.70 0.08 0.12 
Approximated percentage loans 
made in past 12 months to: 
Individual businesses 
120 0 0.92 0.19 0.17 
Approximated percentage loans 
made in past 12 months to: Other 120 0 0.60 0.09 0.12 
Valid N (listwise) 103     
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Table AI: Group Statistics for t-Test 
Group Statistics 
  
Lender 
or 
borrower N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
How well do you think the available amount of 
bank/RCC loans can serve the credit demand of 
farm households 
1.00 120 1.78 .476 .043 
.00 168 1.58 .594 .046 
If you reject a loan application, where do you think 
the farm household borrowers will likely obtain the 
loan? 
1.00 120 2.42 1.274 .116 
.00 203 6.67 9.825 .690 
Reason to reject a loan application - Insufficient 
collateral 
1.00 120 1.83 .382 .035 
.00 11 1.64 .505 .152 
Reason to reject a loan application - 
Crops/Livestock subject to too much price risk 
1.00 120 1.68 .470 .043 
.00 10 1.00 .000 .000 
Reason to reject a loan application - Subject to too 
much yield risk 
1.00 120 1.63 .486 .044 
.00 10 1.40 .516 .163 
Reason to reject a loan application - The crops 
grown are vulnerable to the extreme weather 
1.00 120 1.43 .496 .045 
.00 10 1.00 .000 .000 
Reason to reject a loan application - The farm 
household borrower has failed to repay the loan in 
the past 
1.00 120 2.00 .000 .000 
.00 10 1.00 .000 .000 
Reason to reject a loan application - The farm 
household borrower has old debt outstanding 
1.00 120 1.89 .312 .028 
.00 0 . . . 
Reason to reject a loan application - Personally do 
not believe that the farm household borrower is 
trustworthy 
1.00 120 1.61 .490 .045 
.00 10 1.20 .422 .133 
Reason to reject a loan application - Do not believe 
that the farm household borrower could earn 
enough income 
1.00 120 1.57 .498 .045 
.00 10 1.00 .000 .000 
Reason to reject a loan application - Do not believe 
that the farm household borrower has stable 
income 
1.00 120 1.51 .502 .046 
.00 0 . . . 
Reason to reject a loan application - Do not believe 
that the farm household borrower could properly 
manage his income to repay a loan 
1.00 120 1.55 .500 .046 
.00 0 . . . 
Reason to reject a loan application - Mismatch 
between the repayment schedule required by RCC 
or bank and the timing of  sales from the farm 
household borrower’s farm 
1.00 120 1.53 .501 .046 
.00 10 1.00 .000 .000 
Reason to reject a loan application - Could not find 
someone to guarantee loan 
1.00 120 1.76 .430 .039 
.00 10 1.30 .483 .153 
Reason to reject a loan application - Other 
1.00 120 1.77 .425 .039 
.00 0 . . . 
Do you think your farm household borrower 
perceive his/her personal credit as important? 
1.00 120 3.80 1.034 .094 
.00 282 4.50 .717 .043 
Does your RCC only lend loans when borrowers 
provide “Group Guarantee”?  
1.00 120 1.63 .486 .044 
.00 123 1.00 .000 .000 
Do you think it is hard for a borrower to get a loan? 
1.00 120 3.61 .892 .081 
.00 199 3.20 1.214 .086 
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Table AI: Group Statistics for t-Test (Continued) 
Do you think the procedure is complicated for a 
farm household borrower to apply for a loan?  
1.00 120 2.56 .924 .084 
.00 200 2.96 1.017 .072 
Do you think a loan application takes very long? 
1.00 120 2.11 .632 .058 
.00 198 1.96 .667 .047 
If your farm household borrower is a member of a 
Group Guarantee, You will lend him/her a larger 
loan than other borrowers could get, because of 
his/her Group Guarantee membership? 
1.00 120 2.04 .703 .064 
.00 73 3.42 1.013 .119 
If your farm household borrower is a member of a 
Group Guarantee, You will make it easier for 
him/her to get a loan, because of his/her Group 
Guarantee membership? 
1.00 120 2.48 .916 .084 
.00 73 3.75 .910 .106 
If your farm household borrower is a member of a 
Group Guarantee, You think the borrower will still 
prefer to join a Group Guarantee to get larger 
loans, even if he/she could get a loan individually? 
1.00 120 2.46 .986 .090 
.00 73 3.51 1.345 .157 
If your farm household borrower is a member of a 
Group Guarantee, You will give a lower interest 
rate to him/her than what you give to other 
borrowers, because of his/her Group Guarantee 
membership? 
1.00 120 2.26 .912 .083 
.00 73 3.18 .991 .116 
If a borrower does not join a Group Guarantee, you 
think it’s because: He/She has sufficient collateral 
to obtain a loan 
1.00 120 3.22 1.055 .096 
.00 215 1.92 .903 .062 
If a borrower does not join a Group Guarantee, you 
think it’s because: He/She does not want to 
guarantee someone else’s debt 
1.00 120 3.20 .949 .087 
.00 215 3.37 1.387 .095 
If a borrower does not join a Group Guarantee, you 
think it’s because: The procedures of joining a 
Group Guarantee are too bothersome 
1.00 120 2.49 .935 .085 
.00 194 2.04 1.035 .074 
If your borrower could borrow more debt from 
money lenders, you think they will: 
1.00 120 1.50 .580 .053 
.00 271 1.20 .444 .027 
Do you think that agriculture/farming is crucial 
1.00 120 3.98 .898 .082 
.00 291 3.37 1.168 .068 
Your RCC cares about the well-being of farmers 
1.00 120 4.37 .744 .068 
.00 291 3.02 1.266 .074 
Your RCC cares about the borrower and his/her 
household 
1.00 120 4.28 .611 .056 
.00 289 2.79 1.195 .070 
Do you think your RCC provides loan products that 
are flexible enough to meet farmers’ ability to repay 
when they sell their products/at harvest etc.?  
1.00 120 3.32 1.195 .109 
.00 289 2.60 1.108 .065 
Your RCC will provide loans to agriculture even 
when there is a downturn in the agricultural 
economy 
1.00 120 3.68 1.030 .094 
.00 290 3.06 1.210 .071 
Do you think your RCC is doing well in the lending 
practices 
1.00 120 3.93 .896 .082 
.00 286 3.61 1.070 .063 
Do you think your RCC is doing well in the services 
it provides 
1.00 120 4.13 .788 .072 
.00 286 3.64 1.114 .066 
  
83 
 
 
Table AI: Group Statistics for t-Test (Continued) 
 
Do you think borrowers can find suitable channels 
to get help or to file complaints if he/she is not 
satisfied with the financial services provided by 
your RCC? 
1.00 120 3.98 .825 .075 
.00 285 2.62 1.074 .064 
Do you think that there should be at least one 
Government regulated source of agricultural credit 
dedicated to providing loans to farming, whether 
the agricultural economy is good or bad? 
1.00 120 3.47 1.181 .108 
.00 286 3.65 1.078 .064 
Do you think that it is a good idea to allow urban or 
city banks to set up bank branches in rural areas? 
1.00 120 3.07 1.364 .125 
.00 290 3.79 1.088 .064 
Do you think that it is a good idea to encourage 
banks and RCCs to set up more ATMs, POS, as 
well as mobile banking, in rural areas 
1.00 120 4.44 .754 .069 
.00 285 3.97 1.105 .065 
Do you think farm household borrowers would be 
willing to pay more than the current interest rate to 
obtain a larger loan? 
1.00 120 2.36 1.019 .093 
.00 290 2.57 1.296 .076 
What proportion of household income do you think 
the farmers are able to save in a year (in RMB)? 
1.00 120 3.58 .717 .065 
.00 189 2.44 .717 .052 
Do you think farmers could obtain needed amount 
of money from Banks or RCCs for consumption, 
education and healthcare purposes? 
1.00 120 2.76 1.061 .097 
.00 287 2.32 1.294 .076 
Do you think farmers could obtain needed amount 
of money from Banks or RCCs for farming and 
business purposes?  
1.00 120 3.74 .815 .074 
.00 287 2.34 1.274 .075 
Biggest concerns when you make lending 
decisions - The farm household borrower has 
unpaid debts on previous loans from your RCC or 
banks 
1.00 120 3.86 1.071 .098 
.00 275 1.95 1.095 .066 
Biggest concerns when you make lending 
decisions - The farm household borrower’s family 
culture is to borrow as little as possible 
1.00 120 3.13 1.061 .097 
.00 275 3.71 1.265 .076 
Biggest concerns when you make lending 
decisions - You do not consider this household 
“credit-worthy” 
1.00 120 2.96 1.103 .101 
.00 277 2.12 .985 .059 
Biggest concerns when you make lending 
decisions - The farm household borrower does not 
want to ask another villager to sign a group 
guarantee 
1.00 120 2.83 1.074 .098 
.00 273 2.47 1.185 .072 
Biggest concerns when you make lending 
decisions - The farm household borrower could not 
find someone to provide a third-party individual 
guarantee 
1.00 120 2.78 1.134 .103 
.00 269 3.15 1.356 .083 
Biggest concerns when you make lending 
decisions - The farm household borrower does not 
want to have to guarantee another villager’s debts 
1.00 120 3.38 .880 .080 
.00 274 2.51 1.133 .068 
Biggest concerns when you make lending 
decisions - The farm household borrower thinks 
that the process of getting a group guarantee is too 
cumbersome/difficult 
1.00 120 2.69 .960 .088 
.00 273 2.22 1.265 .077 
Biggest concerns when you make lending 
decisions - Interest rates on RCC or bank loans are 
higher than interest rates that a farm household 
borrower could obtain from friends or relatives 
1.00 120 2.71 1.048 .096 
.00 277 3.74 1.038 .062 
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Table AI: Group Statistics for t-Test (Continued) 
Biggest concerns when you make lending 
decisions - Interest rates on RCC or bank loans are 
higher than a farm household borrower is able to 
pay 
1.00 120 2.73 .935 .085 
.00 277 2.47 1.051 .063 
Biggest concerns when you make lending 
decisions - The farm household borrower does not 
own the collateral to get a loan 
1.00 120 3.27 1.083 .099 
.00 276 3.43 1.369 .082 
Biggest concerns when you make lending 
decisions - The banks/RCCs are located too far for 
the farm household borrowers to travel 
1.00 120 2.04 .965 .088 
.00 277 1.64 .775 .047 
Biggest concerns when you make lending 
decisions - The farm household borrower thinks 
your RCC or bank requires too much paper work 
1.00 120 1.68 .917 .084 
.00 274 2.05 1.083 .065 
Biggest concerns when you make lending 
decisions - The farm household borrower thinks 
your RCC or bank takes too long in approving a 
loan 
1.00 120 2.91 1.029 .094 
.00 274 2.09 1.111 .067 
Biggest concerns when you make lending 
decisions - Do you think that farm household 
borrowers believe your RCC colleagues or bank 
lenders require a bribe from them to approve their 
loan applications 
1.00 120 2.64 1.011 .092 
.00 271 2.19 1.011 .061 
Biggest concerns when you make lending 
decisions - The farm household borrower prefers to 
borrow from a friends or relative 
1.00 120 1.95 .798 .073 
.00 278 3.96 1.101 .066 
Biggest concerns when you make lending 
decisions - It’s easier for the farm household 
borrower to obtain loans from friends and relatives 
rather than from banks and RCCs 
1.00 120 2.98 1.004 .092 
.00 278 3.99 1.121 .067 
Biggest concerns when you make lending 
decisions - The farm household borrower prefers to 
borrow from a money lender 
1.00 120 2.97 1.037 .095 
.00 277 1.63 .827 .050 
Biggest concerns when you make lending 
decisions - The farm household borrower prefers to 
get supplier credit or to transact on credit 
1.00 120 2.86 .990 .090 
.00 275 2.79 1.179 .071 
Biggest concerns when you make lending 
decisions - The farm household borrower does not 
like to be indebted to a bank or RCC 
1.00 120 2.96 .991 .090 
.00 276 3.60 1.359 .082 
Biggest concerns when you make lending 
decisions - The farm household borrower does not 
like to buy microcredit disability insurance required 
by banks or RCCs 
1.00 120 3.08 1.109 .101 
.00 275 2.34 1.129 .068 
Do you think the farm household borrower would 
be more likely to borrow from a bank or RCC, if 
interest rates on RCC or bank loans were lower 
than current interest rates 
1.00 120 3.76 1.037 .095 
.00 288 3.65 1.268 .075 
Do you think the farm household borrower would 
be more likely to borrow from a bank or RCC, if the 
cost of obtaining a loan (fees, non-interest charges) 
on RCC or bank loans were lower than current 
costs 
1.00 120 3.23 1.080 .099 
.00 288 3.68 1.233 .073 
Whether a farm household borrower has ever 
defaulted on a loan from your RCC, banks, friends 
or relatives, the cause of a default in the past or 
future - Lack of financial recourses 
1.00 120 3.23 1.148 .105 
.00 291 3.66 1.267 .074 
Whether a farm household borrower has ever 
defaulted on a loan from your RCC, banks, friends 
or relatives, the cause of a default in the past or 
future - Terms of contract not clear 
1.00 120 2.41 1.081 .099 
.00 291 1.92 1.161 .068 
85 
 
Table AI: Group Statistics for t-Test (Continued) 
Whether a farm household borrower has ever 
defaulted on a loan from your RCC, banks, friends 
or relatives, the cause of a default in the past or 
future - Suffered crop loss, or cattle loss 
1.00 120 3.47 1.061 .097 
.00 291 3.57 1.438 .084 
Whether a farm household borrower has ever 
defaulted on a loan from your RCC, banks, friends 
or relatives, the cause of a default in the past or 
future - Suffered death or major sickness of a 
family member 
1.00 120 3.55 1.083 .099 
.00 289 3.48 1.214 .071 
Whether a farm household borrower has ever 
defaulted on a loan from your RCC, banks, friends 
or relatives, the cause of a default in the past or 
future - The borrower diverted the loan for other 
purpose 
1.00 120 2.87 1.283 .117 
.00 289 2.24 1.232 .072 
Whether a farm household borrower has ever 
defaulted on a loan from your RCC, banks, friends 
or relatives, the cause of a default in the past or 
future - The borrower believes it could be profitable 
to default on a loan 
1.00 120 2.46 1.256 .115 
.00 288 1.60 .623 .037 
Will you lend a higher loan to a borrower who owns 
more assets (land user rights/home ownership, 
etc.) without using the assets for collateral?  
1.00 120 2.64 1.002 .092 
.00 290 1.96 .940 .055 
Will you lend a higher loan to a borrower who owns 
more assets (land user rights/home ownership, 
etc.) but only if he/she uses the assets as 
collateral? 
1.00 120 3.25 1.169 .107 
.00 286 3.53 1.110 .066 
Will you lend a higher loan to a borrower who owns 
more assets (land user rights/home ownership, 
etc.) at a lower interest rates, without using the 
assets as collateral? 
1.00 120 2.24 .987 .090 
.00 290 2.08 .995 .058 
Will you lend a higher loan to a borrower who owns 
more assets (land user rights/home ownership, 
etc.) at a lower interest rates, but only if he/she 
uses the assets as collateral?  
1.00 120 3.07 1.186 .108 
.00 290 2.30 1.124 .066 
Do you believe that honest borrowers are 
compelled to pay higher interest rate, because 
some borrowers do not repay their loan? 
1.00 120 2.58 .993 .091 
.00 289 2.85 1.007 .059 
Do you believe that honest borrowers are not able 
to obtain a needed amount of loan, because some 
of the villagers do not repay their loan or divert the 
loan for other purpose? 
1.00 120 2.93 1.083 .099 
.00 289 2.90 .978 .058 
Do you think that the borrower would be willing to 
pay a higher interest rate, to obtain the needed 
amount of loan?  
1.00 120 2.53 .970 .089 
.00 290 2.37 1.102 .065 
Do you believe that a borrower who accepts a loan 
that is very high relative to his/her assets is more 
likely to VOLUNTARILY default on that loan?   
1.00 120 3.19 1.190 .109 
.00 290 3.21 1.129 .066 
Do you believe that a borrower who accepts a loan 
at a higher interest rate is more likely to 
VOLUNTARILY default on that loan?  
1.00 120 3.14 1.110 .101 
.00 289 3.23 1.251 .074 
What are the criteria that you would prioritize when 
approving a loan: The borrower’s ability to repay  
1.00 120 4.63 .711 .065 
.00 290 4.35 .892 .052 
What are the criteria that you would prioritize when 
approving a loan: The borrower’s social 
connections 
1.00 120 3.03 1.191 .109 
.00 288 3.56 1.164 .069 
What are the criteria that you would prioritize when 
approving a loan: The borrower’s Party 
membership 
1.00 120 2.58 .904 .082 
.00 284 2.55 1.305 .077 
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Table AI: Group Statistics for t-Test (Continued) 
What are the criteria that you would prioritize when 
approving a loan: The borrower’s connection to the 
government  
1.00 120 2.29 .793 .072 
.00 285 2.85 1.185 .070 
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Table AII: Independent Samples Test for t-Test 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
How well do you think 
the available amount of 
bank/RCC loans can 
serve the credit demand 
of farm households 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
19.307 .000 3.017 286 .003 .198 .066 .069 .327 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
3.129 282.267 .002 .198 .063 .073 .322 
If you reject a loan 
application, where do 
you think the farm 
household borrowers will 
likely obtain the loan? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
45.307 .000 -4.721 321 .000 -4.258 .902 -6.033 -2.484 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-6.089 213.362 .000 -4.258 .699 -5.637 -2.880 
Reason to reject a loan 
application - Insufficient 
collateral 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
5.244 .024 1.526 129 .130 .189 .124 -.056 .433 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
1.209 11.074 .252 .189 .156 -.155 .532 
Reason to reject a loan 
application - 
Crops/Livestock subject 
to too much price risk 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
70.531 .000 4.522 128 .000 .675 .149 .380 .970 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
15.721 119.000 .000 .675 .043 .590 .760 
Reason to reject a loan 
application - Subject to 
too much yield risk 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.081 .777 1.400 128 .164 .225 .161 -.093 .543 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
1.330 10.374 .212 .225 .169 -.150 .600 
Reason to reject a loan 
application - The crops 
grown are vulnerable to 
the extreme weather 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
427.761 .000 2.698 128 .008 .425 .158 .113 .737 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
9.379 119.000 .000 .425 .045 .335 .515 
Reason to reject a loan 
application - Personally 
do not believe that the 
farm household borrower 
is trustworthy 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
15.091 .000 2.554 128 .012 .408 .160 .092 .725 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
2.903 11.131 .014 .408 .141 .099 .717 
Reason to reject a loan 
application - Do not 
believe that the farm 
household borrower 
could earn enough 
income 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
544.000 .000 3.588 128 .000 .567 .158 .254 .879 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
12.475 119.000 .000 .567 .045 .477 .657 
Reason to reject a loan 
application - Mismatch 
between the repayment 
schedule required by 
RCC or bank and the 
timing of  sales from the 
farm household 
borrower’s farm 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
3928.615 .000 3.299 128 .001 .525 .159 .210 .840 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
11.468 119.000 .000 .525 .046 .434 .616 
Reason to reject a loan 
application - Could not 
find someone to 
guarantee loan 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.544 .462 3.210 128 .002 .458 .143 .176 .741 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
2.906 10.224 .015 .458 .158 .108 .809 
Do you think your farm 
household borrower 
perceive his/her personal 
credit as important? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
34.514 .000 -7.793 400 .000 -.700 .090 -.877 -.523 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-6.757 169.698 .000 -.700 .104 -.904 -.496 
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Table AII: Independent Samples Test for t-Test (Continued) 
Does your RCC only 
lend loans when 
borrowers provide 
“Group Guarantee”? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1829.815 .000 14.259 241 .000 .625 .044 .539 .711 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
14.083 119.000 .000 .625 .044 .537 .713 
Do you think it is hard for 
a borrower to get a loan? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
9.570 .002 3.191 317 .002 .407 .128 .156 .658 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
3.438 304.864 .001 .407 .118 .174 .640 
Do you think the 
procedure is complicated 
for a farm household 
borrower to apply for a 
loan? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.034 .855 -3.539 318 .000 -.402 .114 -.625 -.178 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-3.624 269.606 .000 -.402 .111 -.620 -.183 
Do you think a loan 
application takes very 
long? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.007 .932 1.965 316 .050 .149 .076 .000 .298 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
1.991 261.732 .048 .149 .075 .002 .296 
If your farm household 
borrower is a member of 
a Group Guarantee, You 
will lend him/her a larger 
loan than other 
borrowers could get, 
because of his/her 
Group Guarantee 
membership? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
30.877 .000 -11.181 191 .000 -1.383 .124 -1.627 -1.139 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed   
-10.261 114.440 .000 -1.383 .135 -1.650 -1.116 
If your farm household 
borrower is a member of 
a Group Guarantee, You 
will make it easier for 
him/her to get a loan, 
because of his/her 
Group Guarantee 
membership? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.109 .742 -9.425 191 .000 -1.278 .136 -1.546 -1.011 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-9.443 153.061 .000 -1.278 .135 -1.546 -1.011 
If your farm household 
borrower is a member of 
a Group Guarantee, You 
think the borrower will 
still prefer to join a Group 
Guarantee to get larger 
loans, even if he/she 
could get a loan 
individually? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
12.898 .000 -6.224 191 .000 -1.049 .168 -1.381 -.716 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed   
-5.782 119.112 .000 -1.049 .181 -1.408 -.689 
If your farm household 
borrower is a member of 
a Group Guarantee, You 
will give a lower interest 
rate to him/her than what 
you give to other 
borrowers, because of 
his/her Group Guarantee 
membership? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.111 .739 -6.574 191 .000 -.920 .140 -1.196 -.644 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed   
-6.443 142.456 .000 -.920 .143 -1.202 -.638 
If a borrower does not 
join a Group Guarantee, 
you think it’s because: 
He/She has sufficient 
collateral to obtain a loan 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
7.485 .007 11.888 333 .000 1.300 .109 1.085 1.516 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
11.378 216.174 .000 1.300 .114 1.075 1.526 
If a borrower does not 
join a Group Guarantee, 
you think it’s because: 
He/She does not want to 
guarantee someone 
else’s debt 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
87.246 .000 -1.177 333 .240 -.167 .142 -.447 .112 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-1.305 319.452 .193 -.167 .128 -.420 .085 
If a borrower does not 
join a Group Guarantee, 
you think it’s because: 
The procedures of 
joining a Group 
Guarantee are too 
bothersome 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.000 .999 3.931 312 .000 .456 .116 .228 .684 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
4.026 271.600 .000 .456 .113 .233 .678 
If your borrower could 
borrow more debt from 
money lenders, you think 
they will: 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
51.404 .000 5.602 389 .000 .301 .054 .195 .406 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
5.063 183.398 .000 .301 .059 .184 .418 
89 
 
Table AII: Independent Samples Test for t-Test (Continued) 
Do you think that 
agriculture/farming is 
crucial 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
51.421 .000 5.176 409 .000 .616 .119 .382 .849 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
5.764 285.865 .000 .616 .107 .405 .826 
Your RCC cares about 
the well-being of farmers 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
69.825 .000 10.919 409 .000 1.349 .124 1.107 1.592 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
13.414 361.443 .000 1.349 .101 1.152 1.547 
Your RCC cares about 
the borrower and his/her 
household 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
104.989 .000 12.972 407 .000 1.491 .115 1.265 1.717 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
16.616 390.500 .000 1.491 .090 1.315 1.667 
Do you think your RCC 
provides loan products 
that are flexible enough 
to meet farmers’ ability to 
repay when they sell 
their products/at harvest 
etc.? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
4.277 .039 5.858 407 .000 .722 .123 .479 .964 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
5.677 208.162 .000 .722 .127 .471 .972 
Your RCC will provide 
loans to agriculture even 
when there is a downturn 
in the agricultural 
economy 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
13.863 .000 4.921 408 .000 .620 .126 .372 .867 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
5.258 258.866 .000 .620 .118 .388 .852 
Do you think your RCC 
is doing well in the 
lending practices 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
25.070 .000 2.925 404 .004 .325 .111 .107 .543 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
3.143 264.509 .002 .325 .103 .121 .528 
Do you think your RCC 
is doing well in the 
services it provides 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
39.627 .000 4.409 404 .000 .493 .112 .273 .713 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
5.059 311.095 .000 .493 .098 .302 .685 
Do you think borrowers 
can find suitable 
channels to get help or 
to file complaints if 
he/she is not satisfied 
with the financial 
services provided by 
your RCC? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
43.624 .000 12.394 403 .000 1.357 .110 1.142 1.573 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
13.775 287.983 .000 1.357 .099 1.163 1.551 
Do you think that there 
should be at least one 
Government regulated 
source of agricultural 
credit dedicated to 
providing loans to 
farming, whether the 
agricultural economy is 
good or bad? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
6.889 .009 -1.523 404 .129 -.184 .121 -.421 .053 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed   
-1.467 206.237 .144 -.184 .125 -.431 .063 
Do you think that it is a 
good idea to allow urban 
or city banks to set up 
bank branches in rural 
areas? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
24.825 .000 -5.667 408 .000 -.723 .128 -.974 -.472 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-5.165 184.631 .000 -.723 .140 -.999 -.447 
Do you think that it is a 
good idea to encourage 
banks and RCCs to set 
up more ATMs, POS, as 
well as mobile banking, 
in rural areas 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
25.853 .000 4.289 403 .000 .473 .110 .256 .690 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
4.984 321.514 .000 .473 .095 .286 .660 
Do you think farm 
household borrowers 
would be willing to pay 
more than the current 
interest rate to obtain a 
larger loan? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
30.420 .000 -1.589 408 .113 -.211 .133 -.471 .050 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-1.753 279.857 .081 -.211 .120 -.447 .026 
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Table AII: Independent Samples Test for t-Test (Continued) 
What proportion of 
household income do 
you think the farmers are 
able to save in a year (in 
RMB)? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.889 .170 13.608 307 .000 1.139 .084 .974 1.304 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
13.609 253.451 .000 1.139 .084 .974 1.304 
Do you think farmers 
could obtain needed 
amount of money from 
Banks or RCCs for 
consumption, education 
and healthcare 
purposes? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
13.287 .000 3.248 405 .001 .434 .134 .171 .697 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
3.521 269.612 .001 .434 .123 .191 .677 
Do you think farmers 
could obtain needed 
amount of money from 
Banks or RCCs for 
farming and business 
purposes? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
48.104 .000 11.149 405 .000 1.404 .126 1.156 1.651 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
13.271 339.194 .000 1.404 .106 1.196 1.612 
Biggest concerns when 
you make lending 
decisions - The farm 
household borrower has 
unpaid debts on previous 
loans from your RCC or 
banks 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.049 .825 16.013 393 .000 1.906 .119 1.672 2.140 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
16.150 231.289 .000 1.906 .118 1.673 2.138 
Biggest concerns when 
you make lending 
decisions - The farm 
household borrower’s 
family culture is to 
borrow as little as 
possible 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
11.565 .001 -4.389 393 .000 -.579 .132 -.839 -.320 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-4.701 267.730 .000 -.579 .123 -.822 -.337 
Biggest concerns when 
you make lending 
decisions - You do not 
consider this household 
“credit-worthy” 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2.492 .115 7.481 395 .000 .836 .112 .616 1.055 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
7.154 204.889 .000 .836 .117 .605 1.066 
Biggest concerns when 
you make lending 
decisions - The farm 
household borrower 
does not want to ask 
another villager to sign a 
group guarantee 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
8.330 .004 2.851 391 .005 .360 .126 .112 .608 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
2.962 249.150 .003 .360 .121 .121 .599 
Biggest concerns when 
you make lending 
decisions - The farm 
household borrower 
could not find someone 
to provide a third-party 
individual guarantee 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
17.720 .000 -2.662 387 .008 -.377 .142 -.656 -.099 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-2.849 270.459 .005 -.377 .132 -.638 -.117 
Biggest concerns when 
you make lending 
decisions - The farm 
household borrower 
does not want to have to 
guarantee another 
villager’s debts 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
10.117 .002 7.428 392 .000 .864 .116 .635 1.093 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
8.188 288.324 .000 .864 .106 .656 1.072 
Biggest concerns when 
you make lending 
decisions - The farm 
household borrower 
thinks that the process of 
getting a group 
guarantee is too 
cumbersome/difficult 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
12.209 .001 3.621 391 .000 .468 .129 .214 .722 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
4.024 294.962 .000 .468 .116 .239 .697 
Biggest concerns when 
you make lending 
decisions - Interest rates 
on RCC or bank loans 
are higher than interest 
rates that a farm 
household borrower 
could obtain from friends 
or relatives 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.058 .810 -9.069 395 .000 -1.032 .114 -1.255 -.808 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed   
-9.032 224.079 .000 -1.032 .114 -1.257 -.807 
Biggest concerns when 
you make lending 
decisions - Interest rates 
on RCC or bank loans 
are higher than a farm 
household borrower is 
able to pay 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.378 .539 2.332 395 .020 .259 .111 .041 .478 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
2.443 252.479 .015 .259 .106 .050 .468 
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Table AII: Independent Samples Test for t-Test (Continued) 
Biggest concerns when 
you make lending 
decisions - The farm 
household borrower 
does not own the 
collateral to get a loan 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
39.316 .000 -1.167 394 .244 -.164 .141 -.442 .113 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-1.278 282.913 .202 -.164 .129 -.418 .089 
Biggest concerns when 
you make lending 
decisions - The 
banks/RCCs are located 
too far for the farm 
household borrowers to 
travel 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.252 .616 4.402 395 .000 .403 .091 .223 .583 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
4.041 188.517 .000 .403 .100 .206 .599 
Biggest concerns when 
you make lending 
decisions - The farm 
household borrower 
thinks your RCC or bank 
requires too much paper 
work 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2.443 .119 -3.212 392 .001 -.364 .113 -.587 -.141 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-3.428 265.791 .001 -.364 .106 -.573 -.155 
Biggest concerns when 
you make lending 
decisions - The farm 
household borrower 
thinks your RCC or bank 
takes too long in 
approving a loan 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.383 .536 6.870 392 .000 .817 .119 .583 1.051 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
7.079 243.747 .000 .817 .115 .590 1.044 
Biggest concerns when 
you make lending 
decisions - Do you think 
that farm household 
borrowers believe your 
RCC colleagues or bank 
lenders require a bribe 
from them to approve 
their loan applications 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
5.307 .022 4.057 389 .000 .450 .111 .232 .668 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed   
4.058 228.069 .000 .450 .111 .231 .668 
Biggest concerns when 
you make lending 
decisions - The farm 
household borrower 
prefers to borrow from a 
friends or relative 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
51.065 .000 -18.092 396 .000 -2.014 .111 -2.233 -1.795 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-20.492 306.204 .000 -2.014 .098 -2.207 -1.821 
Biggest concerns when 
you make lending 
decisions - It’s easier for 
the farm household 
borrower to obtain loans 
from friends and 
relatives rather than from 
banks and RCCs 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
7.520 .006 -8.502 396 .000 -1.009 .119 -1.243 -.776 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-8.881 250.335 .000 -1.009 .114 -1.233 -.786 
Biggest concerns when 
you make lending 
decisions - The farm 
household borrower 
prefers to borrow from a 
money lender 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2.993 .084 13.681 395 .000 1.339 .098 1.146 1.531 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
12.524 187.503 .000 1.339 .107 1.128 1.549 
Biggest concerns when 
you make lending 
decisions - The farm 
household borrower 
prefers to get supplier 
credit or to transact on 
credit 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
9.474 .002 .533 393 .594 .066 .123 -.176 .308 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
.571 267.542 .569 .066 .115 -.161 .292 
Biggest concerns when 
you make lending 
decisions - The farm 
household borrower 
does not like to be 
indebted to a bank or 
RCC 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
64.969 .000 -4.670 394 .000 -.643 .138 -.914 -.372 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-5.273 305.100 .000 -.643 .122 -.883 -.403 
Biggest concerns when 
you make lending 
decisions - The farm 
household borrower 
does not like to buy 
microcredit disability 
insurance required by 
banks or RCCs 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.394 .531 5.996 393 .000 .737 .123 .495 .978 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
6.039 230.611 .000 .737 .122 .496 .977 
Do you think the farm 
household borrower 
would be more likely to 
borrow from a bank or 
RCC, if interest rates on 
RCC or bank loans were 
lower than current 
interest rates 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
16.152 .000 .833 406 .406 .109 .131 -.148 .366 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
.904 270.018 .367 .109 .121 -.128 .346 
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Table AII: Independent Samples Test for t-Test (Continued) 
Do you think the farm 
household borrower 
would be more likely to 
borrow from a bank or 
RCC, if the cost of 
obtaining a loan (fees, 
non-interest charges) on 
RCC or bank loans were 
lower than current costs 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
9.872 .002 -3.549 406 .000 -.459 .129 -.713 -.205 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed   
-3.747 252.346 .000 -.459 .123 -.700 -.218 
Whether a farm 
household borrower has 
ever defaulted on a loan 
from your RCC, banks, 
friends or relatives, the 
cause of a default in the 
past or future - Lack of 
financial recourses 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.893 .170 -3.223 409 .001 -.431 .134 -.694 -.168 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-3.357 243.328 .001 -.431 .128 -.684 -.178 
Whether a farm 
household borrower has 
ever defaulted on a loan 
from your RCC, banks, 
friends or relatives, the 
cause of a default in the 
past or future - Terms of 
contract not clear 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.007 .935 3.946 409 .000 .487 .124 .245 .730 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
4.066 237.254 .000 .487 .120 .251 .724 
Whether a farm 
household borrower has 
ever defaulted on a loan 
from your RCC, banks, 
friends or relatives, the 
cause of a default in the 
past or future - Suffered 
crop loss, or cattle loss 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
35.853 .000 -.691 409 .490 -.100 .145 -.386 .185 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-.782 297.558 .435 -.100 .128 -.353 .152 
Whether a farm 
household borrower has 
ever defaulted on a loan 
from your RCC, banks, 
friends or relatives, the 
cause of a default in the 
past or future - Suffered 
death or major sickness 
of a family member 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2.532 .112 .567 407 .571 .072 .128 -.179 .324 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed   
.594 247.502 .553 .072 .122 -.168 .313 
Whether a farm 
household borrower has 
ever defaulted on a loan 
from your RCC, banks, 
friends or relatives, the 
cause of a default in the 
past or future - The 
borrower diverted the 
loan for other purpose 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.152 .697 4.611 407 .000 .624 .135 .358 .891 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed   
4.534 214.560 .000 .624 .138 .353 .896 
Whether a farm 
household borrower has 
ever defaulted on a loan 
from your RCC, banks, 
friends or relatives, the 
cause of a default in the 
past or future - The 
borrower believes it 
could be profitable to 
default on a loan 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
105.845 .000 9.234 406 .000 .861 .093 .678 1.044 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed   
7.152 143.986 .000 .861 .120 .623 1.099 
Will you lend a higher 
loan to a borrower who 
owns more assets (land 
user rights/home 
ownership, etc.) without 
using the assets for 
collateral? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
7.211 .008 6.563 408 .000 .683 .104 .478 .888 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
6.391 209.951 .000 .683 .107 .472 .894 
Will you lend a higher 
loan to a borrower who 
owns more assets (land 
user rights/home 
ownership, etc.) but only 
if he/she uses the assets 
as collateral? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.026 .871 -2.266 404 .024 -.278 .123 -.519 -.037 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-2.219 213.421 .028 -.278 .125 -.525 -.031 
Will you lend a higher 
loan to a borrower who 
owns more assets (land 
user rights/home 
ownership, etc.) at a 
lower interest rates, 
without using the assets 
as collateral? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.563 .454 1.538 408 .125 .166 .108 -.046 .378 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
1.544 223.850 .124 .166 .107 -.046 .377 
Will you lend a higher 
loan to a borrower who 
owns more assets (land 
user rights/home 
ownership, etc.) at a 
lower interest rates, but 
only if he/she uses the 
assets as collateral? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.280 .597 6.153 408 .000 .763 .124 .519 1.007 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
6.018 211.844 .000 .763 .127 .513 1.013 
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Table AII: Independent Samples Test for t-Test (Continued) 
Do you believe that 
honest borrowers are 
compelled to pay higher 
interest rate, because 
some borrowers do not 
repay their loan? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.896 .344 -2.568 407 .011 -.280 .109 -.494 -.066 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-2.583 225.310 .010 -.280 .108 -.493 -.066 
Do you believe that 
honest borrowers are not 
able to obtain a needed 
amount of loan, because 
some of the villagers do 
not repay their loan or 
divert the loan for other 
purpose? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.440 .231 .276 407 .783 .030 .110 -.185 .246 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
.264 203.599 .792 .030 .114 -.195 .256 
Do you think that the 
borrower would be 
willing to pay a higher 
interest rate, to obtain 
the needed amount of 
loan? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
5.771 .017 1.451 408 .148 .168 .116 -.060 .395 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
1.530 250.829 .127 .168 .110 -.048 .384 
Do you believe that a 
borrower who accepts a 
loan that is very high 
relative to his/her assets 
is more likely to 
VOLUNTARILY default 
on that loan? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.138 .711 -.150 408 .881 -.019 .124 -.263 .226 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-.147 211.949 .883 -.019 .127 -.270 .232 
Do you believe that a 
borrower who accepts a 
loan at a higher interest 
rate is more likely to 
VOLUNTARILY default 
on that loan? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
3.026 .083 -.659 407 .510 -.087 .132 -.345 .172 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-.692 249.085 .489 -.087 .125 -.333 .160 
What are the criteria that 
you would prioritize 
when approving a loan: 
The borrower’s ability to 
repay 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
17.073 .000 2.985 408 .003 .273 .092 .093 .453 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
3.277 276.413 .001 .273 .083 .109 .437 
What are the criteria that 
you would prioritize 
when approving a loan: 
The borrower’s social 
connections 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.038 .845 -4.165 406 .000 -.531 .127 -.781 -.280 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-4.126 218.229 .000 -.531 .129 -.784 -.277 
What are the criteria that 
you would prioritize 
when approving a loan: 
The borrower’s Party 
membership 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
29.197 .000 .260 402 .795 .034 .131 -.223 .291 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
.301 317.587 .764 .034 .113 -.189 .257 
What are the criteria that 
you would prioritize 
when approving a loan: 
The borrower’s 
connection to the 
government 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
22.876 .000 -4.727 403 .000 -.557 .118 -.789 -.326 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-5.530 326.862 .000 -.557 .101 -.756 -.359 
 
Note: If the significance for Levene's test is 0.05 or below, then the "Equal Variances Not Assumed" test (the one on the bottom) is used. 
Otherwise we use the "Equal Variances Assumed" test (the one on the top).
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